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1. The Bodell Loan to MSF/Jenson 
In the summer of 2000, Appellant/Defendant Bodell Construction Company 
("Bodell") made a loan of $4 million (the "Bodell Loan") to MSF Properties, L.C. 
("MSF"), a company owned and managed by Marc Jenson ("Jenson"). Jenson 
was a so-called hard money lender who made high risk loans at very high interest 
rates. Bodell had previously loaned MSF $1 million in another transaction. 
Bodell knew that Jenson would loan the $4 million to someone else in a "hard 
money" loan transaction. 
The terms of the Bodell Loan were extreme: Interest of 1% per week - 52% 
per annum - plus an $80,000 loan origination fee for a 30 day term. 
Bodell claims that it relied upon a letter allegedly from Ben Lightner, an 
employee of Bank One, in deciding to loan the $4 million to Jenson.1 The letter, 
addressed "To Whom It May Concern," simply states that the proceeds of a $165 
million loan from Arimex International, Ltd. to MadTrax Group, LLC will be 
deposited in an account of Bank One. The letter says nothing about those funds 
being available to pay Bodell. Bodell had no relationship with Bank One, had 
never heard of Lightner, and made no attempt to contact Bank One or otherwise 
verify the letter. Bodell made no attempt to verify any of the statements in the 
letter, made no attempt to contact Arimex International, Ltd. to verify the $165 
1
 The authenticity of the Lightner letter is contested. For purposes of the 
summary judgment motion which was granted by the trial court (and for this 
appeal), Bank One assumes arguendo that the letter was authentic. 
1 
million loan would in fact be made, and made no investigation of Arimex to 
determine its reliability and capacity to make such a large loan. Three years after 
the Bodell Loan was made and after Bodell had settled its claims with MSF and 
Jenson, without asserting any claim against Bank One or even having any 
communications with it, Bodell filed suit against Bank One. 
Prior to filing suit against Bank One, Bodell settled its claims with MSF 
and Jenson for $3 million. The parties executed a Settlement Agreement dated 
March 18, 2003 (the "Settlement Agreement"). The Settlement Agreement was 
an accord and satisfaction that satisfied and extinguished all claims of Bodell 
relating to the Bodell Loan, including the claims against Bank One. 
2. Accord and Satisfaction 
Bank One moved for summary judgment on the ground that the Settlement 
Agreement was an accord and satisfaction, which satisfied in full the claims of 
Bodell and extinguished the obligation. Since Bodell had been paid in full, 
Bodell could not assert claims against anyone else, including Bank One, relating 
to the Bodell loan. The trial court agreed, granted the motion, and dismissed all 
claims of Bodell. The core issue on this appeal is whether the Settlement 
Agreement constituted an accord and satisfaction which bars any claims against 
Bank One. 
3. The "Affirm on Any Ground" Doctrine 
Bank One moved for summary judgment against Bodell in the trial court on 
seven separate and independent theories. The trial court granted Bank One's 
2 
motion for summary judgment on the accord and satisfaction theory and declined 
to rule on the other theories. 
Utah appellate courts have adopted the "affirm on any ground doctrine" 
which provides that if a ruling can be affirmed on any legal ground or theory 
apparent on the record, the appellate court may sustain the ruling on such 
grounds, even though such grounds or theories are not urged or argued on appeal 
and were not considered or passed on by the lower court. If this Court does not 
affirm the trial court ruling on accord and satisfaction, this Court may 
nonetheless still affirm the trial court on any one of the other six grounds and 
theories asserted in the trial court for summary judgment. These arguments were 
fully briefed and argued in the trial court. If summary judgment based on accord 
and satisfaction is not affirmed, this Court should then consider and affirm the 
dismissal by the trial court on any of the remaining six summary judgment 
arguments. 
4. Damages 
Bodell's appeal of this issue is not ripe and should be dismissed as 
untimely. 
Alternatively, the District Court's ruling was appropriate and amply 
warranted. Throughout fact discovery, Bodell clearly and repeatedly stated that it 
sought damages of $4 million (the principal amount it loaned to MSF Properties) 
plus interest at the legal rate, less the amounts repaid by Jenson. These repeated 
representations were never amended nor supplemented. Then, nearly a month 
3 
after the close of fact discovery, Bodell attempted to claim vastly increased 
damages through the report of its expert, Merrill Weight. These theories came as 
a complete surprise to the Defendants. The new theories raised the claimed 
damages to nearly $19 million. The District Court found that, in order for the 
Defendants to be able to fairly meet these new theories and the facts on which 
they were premised, fact discovery would have to be re-opened and the trial 
setting delayed. Because Bodell failed to disclose these new damages theories 
(and the facts on which they were premised) prior to the end of fact discovery, 
and because the re-opening of fact discovery would have been necessary to 
contest the assumptions in Weight's report and result in a continuance of the trial, 
the District Court properly excluded the new theories. 
Moreover, in the event this Court considers the issue and finds there was an 
abuse of discretion in not allowing the new damage theories, the District Court's 
decision should be affirmed on the alternate ground (raised in the District Court 
but not decided because it was rendered moot by the District Court's exclusion on 
other grounds) that Weight's new theories are not supported by applicable law or 
are contradicted by the facts in the record. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Bank One agrees with the Statement of Jurisdiction set forth in the Brief of 
Appellant. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Bank One disputes the wording of Issue No. 3. As phrased, it recites that 
there are genuine issues of material fact. Bank One denies that there are any 
genuine issues as to any material facts and therefore summary judgment was 
proper. 
Bank One disputes the wording of Issue No. 5 in that it does not identify 
the grounds upon which the Expert Report was stricken. It was stricken on 
procedural, not substantive grounds. The damage theories propounded in the 
Expert Report were not disclosed in Bodell's Rule 26 initial disclosures or in 
repeated discovery requests asking Bodell to set forth its damages and how those 
damages were calculated. Bodell's responses to requests for admissions also 
contradict the damage theories set forth in the Expert Report. A correct statement 
of the issue on appeal is, "Whether the District Court erred in striking the Expert 
Report of Merrill Weight, Bodell's damages expert, on the ground that the 
theories of damages and facts supporting those theories were not previously 
disclosed in Rule 26 initial disclosures or discovery responses and contradict 
responses to requests for admissions concerning the damage theories." 
Bank One also disputes the Standard of Review cited by Bodell for Issue 
No. 5. Bodell asserts that the standard of review "is a question of law that is 
reviewed for correctness." Appellant's Brief at 2-3 {citing Pete v. Youngblood, 
2006 UT App. 303, ^ 7, 141 P.3d 629, 632). The correct standard of review is 
abuse of discretion. Morton v. Continental Banking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 274 (Utah 
5 
1997) (trial courts "are given broad discretion regarding the imposition of 
discovery sanctions"; "Thus we have long held that we will not interfere unless 
abuse of discretion is clearly shown"). 
Bank One submits the following additional issues to be presented for 
review: 
1. If this Court determines that granting summary judgment in favor of 
Bank One on the accord and satisfaction issue was erroneous, should this Court 
then consider the other grounds and theories advocated by Bank One for summary 
judgment upon which the trial court did not rule under the "affirm on any ground" 
doctrine? If such grounds and theories are considered, should summary judgment 
in favor of Bank One be affirmed? Standard of Review: The Utah Court of 
Appeals may affirm a lower court's ruling on any alternate ground even though 
the ground or theory was not identified by the lower court as the basis of its 
ruling or was not passed on by the lower court. Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. 
Neeley Construe. Co., 677 P.2d 1120 (Utah App. 1984). 
2. Should the arguments of Bodell that the District Court erred in 
striking the expert witness report of Bodell's Damages Expert be dismissed on the 
ground the issue is not ripe for appeal? Standard of Review: The Utah Court of 
Appeals may review an issue when a conflict over the application of a legal 
provision or principle has sharpened into an actual or imminent clash of legal 
rights and obligations between the parties. Adelman v. Adelman, 815 P.2d 741, 
744 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
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3. If this Court determines the expert witness issue is ripe and that the 
District Court erred in striking the Expert Report of Merrill Weight on the 
grounds that the theories of damages and facts supporting those theories were not 
previously disclosed in Rule 26 initial disclosures or discovery responses and 
contradict responses to requests for admissions concerning the damage theories, 
should the Expert Report nonetheless remain stricken on the grounds that the 
damages theories asserted in the Expert Report contradict and are not supported 
by legal precedent? Standard of Review: The Utah Court of Appeals may affirm 
a lower court's ruling on any alternate ground even though that ground or theory 
was not identified by the lower court as the basis of its ruling or was not passed 
on by the lower court. Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neeley Construe. Co., 677 
P.2d 1120 (Utah App. 1984). 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
As noted above, Bank One disputes the standard of review asserted by 
Bodell for Issue No. 5. Bank One does not dispute the other standards of review 
cited by Bodell. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Paragraph 6 of Bodell's Statement of the Case contains improper 
conclusions and unfair characterizations and is incomplete. Paragraph 6 
describes the production of the report of Bodell's damages expert which sets forth 
calculations for a number of damage theories. The report was filed nearly a 
month after the close of fact discovery and raised three damage theories that were 
7 
wholly new and different from the damage theory that Bodell had consistently 
and repeatedly disclosed in discovery. These new theories dramatically changed 
previous damage claims, from $4 million less payments plus interest, to almost 
$19 million. Besides coming as a complete surprise to Defendants, the theories 
were based on facts that had previously not been the subject of discovery. The 
primary reason the expert opinions were excluded was that allowing them would 
have required re-opening fact discovery and the delay of the trial. Moreover, the 
new theories were not valid under Utah law. Judge Kennedy allowed Bodell to 
file a second (and late) report from the damages expert that was consistent with 
the damage theory that Bodell had disclosed while fact discovery was open. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
1. Marc Jenson, through his hard money lending business, named MSF 
Properties, was in the business of borrowing funds and then loaning those funds 
to others. Jenson profits on the difference between the interest he pays to borrow 
the money and the interest he receives from lending the money. (R. 3238; Jenson 
Dep. at 305.) 
2. In mid-2000, Jenson met Mark Robbins and learned that Robbins 
needed $8 million to buy out Cherokee & Walker's interest in his bicycle 
2
 The Statement of Facts offered by Bodell is, at times, one-sided, particularly 
concerning how the Lightner Letter allegedly came to be issued and the facts 
bearing on the reasonableness of BodelPs alleged reliance on the Lightner Letter. 
However, those facts are not relevant for this appeal. 
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businesses. After negotiations, Jenson agreed to loan Robbins the $8 million. (R. 
3241-3242; Jenson Dep. at 43-46, 48.) 
3. In the summer of 2000, Robbins also began pursuing an opportunity 
to buy the Mongoose Bicycle Division from Brunswick Corporation. Robbins 
formed a company called MadTrax Group LLC ("MadTrax") to pursue this 
acquisition. (R. 3098-3099, 3101; Robbins Dep. at 81; 194-95; July 11, 2000 
Letter from MadTrax to Brunswick.) 
4. Lincoln Partners, the investment banking firm representing 
Brunswick in the sale of the Mongoose Division, requested information from 
MadTrax about their financing sources for the proposed transaction. (R. 3113-
3114, 3117; August 9, 2000 Letter from Lincoln Partners to Trevor Larson; 
Robbins Dep. at 488-489.) 
5. Robbins was a client of Bank One's private banking services at this 
time. Bank One employee Benjamin Lightner was Mr. Robbins5 private banker. 
Robbins testified that in August 2000, he had conversations with Lightner about 
the fact that "Lincoln Partners and all of the investment bankers were, you know, 
looking for verification of funding and stuff like that." Robbins testified that he 
asked Lightner to draft a letter for Lincoln Partners regarding potential funding 
sources for MadTrax. (R. 3120-3122; Robbins Dep. at 308-310, 316-17, 324-25.) 
6. One of Robbins' potential funding sources for the Mongoose 
acquisition was a loan from Arimex Investments, Ltd. ("Arimex"). Robbins (with 
Lightner in attendance on at least one occasion) had discussions with Arimex 
9 
about a potential loan. (R. 3125-3126, 3130; Robbins Dep. at 255-257; Lightner 
Dep. at 156-57.) 
7. Robbins claims that Lightner produced a letter dated August 22, 
2000 in response to the request regarding funding sources. (R. 3132; Robbins 
Dep., August 22, 2000 Letter (the "Lightner Letter").3) 
8. As of the date of the Lightner Letter, Robbins believed that Arimex 
was willing and able to make the Arimex Loan to MadTrax as described in the 
Lightner Letter. (R. 3138-3140; Robbins Dep. at 286, 447-448.) Indeed, a loan 
agreement for $165 million had been signed by Arimex. (R. 3140, 3142-3156; 
Robbins Dep. at 448; Arimex Loan Agreement.) 
9. Bank One was not a party to the Arimex Loan Agreement. (R. 3142; 
Arimex Loan Agreement.) 
10. The Lightner Letter was intended for Lincoln Partners in connection 
with the proposed Mongoose acquisition, and was not intended for other potential 
investors or for use in any other transaction. (R. 3162-3163; Robbins Dep. 324, 
326-327, 446.) 
11. Jenson's plan was to fund the Robbins loan with $4 million of 
Jenson's own money and $4 million from someone else. Accordingly, Jenson 
approached Mike Bodell, president of Bodell Construction Company, about the 
3
 As noted above, the authenticity and validity of the Lightner Letter is a major, 
disputed issue in this case. However, for purposes of the Motion for Summary 
Judgment (and this appeal), it is assumed arguendo that the letter is authentic and 
was authored by Lightner. 
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possibility of borrowing $4 million that Jenson would, in turn, loan to Robbins 
for the Cherokee & Walker buyout. (R. 3245, 3249; Jenson Dep. at 72-73; 102; 
BodellDep. at 42-45.) 
12. Mike Bodell had known Jenson for nearly twenty years, and had 
recently loaned Jenson $1 million. (R. 3252-3254; Bodell Dep. at 10, 18-20, 31.) 
13. Jenson testified that he received a copy of the Lightner Letter from 
Robbins. (R. 3257, 3260; Jenson Dep. at 215-16; Robbins Dep. at 329.) 
14. On August 30, 2000, Bodell Construction Company loaned $4 
million to Jenson's company, MSF Properties, LC and obtained a personal 
guaranty from Jenson. Bank One was not a party to this loan. (R.3288-3289, 
3295-3297; August 30, 2000 Promissory Note; August 30, 2000 Guaranty.) The 
terms of the Bodell Loan required MSF to pay a loan fee of $80,000 and to pay 
interest of 1% per week - 52% per year. The loan was due in 30 days. (R. 3253; 
BodellDep. at 19-20.) 
15. At the time of the Lightner Letter, Bodell had no relationship 
whatsoever with Bank One. Neither he nor his company was a customer and they 
had no accounts at Bank One. Bodell did not even know who Lightner was. 
Before making the loan to Jenson, Bodell never contacted Lightner or anyone else 
at Bank One. (R. 3303-3304, 3307, 3310; BodellDep. at 11-12, 56; Weight Dep. 
at 65; Bodell Disc. Resp. at 5, Resp. to Req. for Admis. No. 2.) 
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16. Bank One knew nothing about Bodell, or the loan that Bodell 
planned to make to Jenson, and had no discussions with Jenson about Bodell or 
Bodell Construction. (R. 3316-3318; Lightner Dep. at 39, 205, 259.) 
17. None of the funds from the Bodell Loan were paid to Bank One or 
were for Bank One's benefit. (R. 3324, 3326; Bodell Disc. Resp. at 18, Response 
to Int. No. 14; Robbins Dep. at 449-450.) 
18. Jenson failed to repay the Bodell Loan. (R. 2226; First Am. Compl. 
1118.) 
19. For many months, Bodell sought repayment from Jenson—sometimes 
going so far as to make hourly calls to Jenson. (R. 3329-3330; Jenson Dep. at 
329-331.) Jenson made several preliminary payments on the note. (R. 3333-
3334; Jenson Dep. 333-336.) 
20. Finally, on March 18, 2003, Bodell and Jenson entered into a 
Settlement Agreement. (R. 3336-3338; Settlement Agreement.) Pursuant to the 
Settlement Agreement, Jenson paid Bodell $3 million and Bodell accepted those 
funds as payment in full of the Bodell Loan. (R. 3336; Settlement Agreement, f^tf 
1-2.) 
21. Paragraph 2 of the Settlement Agreement states: 
Each of Bodell and BCC [Bodell Construction 
Company], for himself, itself, their affiliates and for all 
persons or entities claiming by, through or under him, it 
or them, hereby (a) releases, acquits, waives and forever 
discharges MSF, its affiliates and their respective 
members, managers, officers, employees and agents 
(each, including without limitation Jenson, an "MSF 
12 
Party") from any and all claims, allegations of fraud, 
charges, demands, losses, damages, obligations, 
liabilities, grievances, causes of action, or suits at law 
and equity of whatsoever kind and nature, expenses, 
costs and attorney fees, whether known or unknown, 
suspected or unsuspected, liquidated or unliquidated 
(each, a "Claim"), arising out of all past affiliations and 
transactions among Bodell, BCC and any MSF Party, 
including, but not limited to, the Loans and all related 
arrangements and transactions, (b). without limiting the 
generality of the foregoing, acknowledges and agrees 
that the obligations of the MSF Parties in connection 
with the Loans, including all principal and interest 
that may have been deemed to have accrued thereon, 
are hereby deemed fully satisfied and repaid in full; 
provided that such releases shall not apply to any 
obligation of MSF or Jenson set forth in this Agreement 
to be performed or observed after the execution and 
delivery hereof. 
(R. 3336; Settlement Agreement f^ 2 (emphasis added).) 
22. Four months after executing the Settlement Agreement, Bodell sued 
Bank One, claiming that it was wrongfully induced to loan money to Jenson 
based on the Lightner Letter. (R. 1; Compl.) The Complaint was later amended 
to add a claim of fraud against Bank One. (R. 2219; First Am. Compl.) 
23. In 2005, Jenson was charged criminally by the State of Utah with 
five felony counts of securities fraud and one felony count of violating the state 
racketeering statute. The factual basis of these charges included the Bodell Loan. 
Subsequent to the filing of Appellant's Brief, Jenson entered into a plea 
agreement. See Def.'s Statement in Advance of No Contest Plea, No Contest 
Plea, and Plea in Abeyance filed May 29, 2008, in the case of State of Utah v. 
Marc S. Jenson, Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
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Case No. 051905391 (the "Criminal Plea"), a copy of which is included in Bank 
One's Addendum 1 at Exhibit 4. In this plea agreement, Jenson agreed to pay 
Michael Bodell, the President and owner of Bodell Construction Company, $1.6 
million within 36 months. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Settlement Agreement between Bodell and Jenson was an accord 
and satisfaction, which satisfied in full and extinguished all claims of Bodell, 
including the claims against Bank One. The District Court correctly granted 
summary judgment on this issue. An accord and satisfaction is an agreement to 
give and accept some performance other than what is actually due as full 
satisfaction of a claim and obligation. The law is well settled that there can be 
but one satisfaction of a debt or obligation. When an accord and satisfaction is 
reached, the obligation is satisfied and extinguished. The debt is gone. There 
cannot be any further recovery on the obligation from anyone, including third 
parties. 
2. If the Court of Appeals determines that summary judgment on the 
accord and satisfaction argument was erroneous, under the "affirm on any 
ground" doctrine, the Court of Appeals should then consider the other six 
arguments for summary judgment which were fully briefed and argued in the 
District Court but on which the lower court did not render a ruling. Summary 
judgment in favor of Bank One can be affirmed on any one of those six 
arguments. It is well established that an appellate court may affirm a ruling on 
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any ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory 
differs from that stated by the trial court and even though such ground or theory 
was not considered or passed on by the trial court. 
3. The District Court's decision to strike the expert witness report of 
Merrill Weight is not ripe for review on appeal. Appellate courts do not render 
advisory opinions. If there is any scenario in which an issue may not need to be 
addressed, the issue is not ripe for appeal. There are several issues under which 
striking of the expert witness report will never be addressed even if the case is 
remanded to the trial court: summary judgment could be granted by the trial 
court on one of the alternate grounds, the case could settle, or a jury could find in 
favor of the Defendants. It is speculative whether the damages issue will ever be 
adjudicated and therefore the issue is not ripe for an appellate review. 
4. The District Court correctly excluded the expert report of Merrill 
Weight which asserted damage theories resulting in more than quadrupling the 
damages disclosed in discovery, on the grounds that (i) the new damage theories 
had not been disclosed in Rule 26(a) Initial Disclosures or discovery responses 
and contradicted responses to Requests for Admissions, (ii) they were not 
disclosed until after the discovery period had closed, and (iii) allowing the new 
theories of damages would necessitate the re-opening of fact discovery and re-
scheduling the trial. Alternatively, even if the procedural grounds for striking the 
expert report were not proper, the new damage theories should be stricken on the 
grounds that they contradict recognized Utah law and contradict the evidence in 
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the record. Bodell's expert witness report improperly seeks damages based on 
theories applicable only to purchase of a tangible asset. The concept of damages 
being equal to the actual value of the asset purchased versus the amount paid due 
to fraud cannot be logically applied to a loan, and courts have not applied this 
theory to a loan transaction. BodelPs expert witness report also calculated 
damages based on a purported reasonable rate of return that could have been 
obtained if the funds had not been invested in a fraudulent transaction. These 
calculations rely on numbers that contradict the evidence in the record and 
therefore cannot be allowed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT CONSTITUTES AN ACCORD 
AND FULL SATISFACTION OF THE CLAIMS IN THIS ACTION 
WHICH SATISFIES AND EXTINGUISHES ALL CLAIMS AGAINST 
BANK ONE 
A. The Settlement Agreement Constitutes an Accord and 
Satisfaction. 
An accord and satisfaction is an agreement to give and accept some 
performance other than that which is actually due as full satisfaction of a claim or 
obligation. ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Raile, 2000 UT 4, f 20, 998 P.2d 254, 259. 
Put another way, "[a]n accord and satisfaction arises when the parties to a 
contract agree that a different performance, to be made in substitution of the 
performance originally agreed upon, will discharge the obligation created under 
the original agreement." Id. The elements of an accord and satisfaction are: "(1) 
an unliquidated claim or a bona fide dispute over the amount due; (2) a payment 
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offered as full settlement of the entire dispute; and (3) an acceptance of the 
payment as full settlement of the dispute." Id. (citing Marton Remodeling v. 
Jensen, 706 P.2d 607, 609-10 (Utah 1985)). 
The law is well settled that there can be but one satisfaction of a debt or 
obligation. See Harris-Dudley Plumbing Co. v. Professional United World 
Travel Assoc., Inc., 592 P.2d 586, 588 (Utah 1979); Blodgett v. Zions First 
National Bank, 752 P.2d 901, 903 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The rationale behind 
this "one satisfaction" rule is that "the wrong is single and entire, and the injured 
party is entitled to one, and only one, satisfaction, no matter how many parties 
may have joined in the act." Jukes v. North American Van Lines, 309 P.2d 692, 
699 (Kan. 1957); see also Luxenburg v. Can-Tex Industries, 257 N.W.2d 804, 
807-808 (Minn. 1977) (holding that "if the injured party has accepted satisfaction 
in full for the injury suffered by him, the law will not permit him to recover again 
for the same injury . . ."). To hold otherwise would allow claimants to obtain 
multiple recoveries for the same injury, as Bodell attempts to do in this action. 
Bodell argues that there was no unliquidated claim or bona fide dispute 
over the amount due and therefore there cannot be an accord and satisfaction. 
This is not an accurate characterization of the facts alleged in the Complaint or 
recited in the Settlement Agreement. Bodell had numerous claims against MSF 
and Jenson, both liquidated and unliquidated, in addition to the loan, which were 
resolved by the Settlement Agreement. 
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Bodell's original Complaint alleged numerous actions by Jenson which, if 
true, would give rise to fraud and other claims against Jenson. (R. 3-4; Compl. ^[j 
12-16.) The Settlement Agreement clearly and expressly provides that it is "a 
full settlement of all obligations, disputes and other matters between them, 
including but not limited to the Loans" (4th Whereas Clause, emphasis added), 
that the release extends to all claims and "allegations of fraud," "whether known 
or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, liquidated or unliquidated ..., arising out 
of all past affiliations and transactions ... including, but not limited to, the Loans 
and all related arrangements and transactions," (R. 3336; Settlement Agreement ^ f 
(emphasis added)), "that the obligations of the MSF Parties in connection with 
the Loans, including all principal and interest that may have been deemed to have 
accrued thereon, are hereby deemed fully satisfied and repaid in full," (id.), and 
that the Settlement Agreement "is a mutual release of claims and that, following 
execution of [the Settlement Agreement], no Bodell Party shall have any claim 
against an MSF Party." (R. 3337; Settlement Agreement f 5.) Bodell 
acknowledged that the Settlement Agreement covers claims beyond the $4 million 
loan: "As the settlement documents demonstrate, the agreement resolved 
outstanding disputes between Jenson and Bodell relating to more than just the $4 
million loan in August, 2000." (R. 3522; Bodell's Mem. in Opp'n to Mot. for 
Summ. J. Def. Mark Robbins at xxxiv |^ 92.) It is undisputedly clear and express 
that Bodell had claims against MSF and Jenson for fraud, as well as on the note 
and guarantee, that those fraud claims were unliquidated, that the Settlement 
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Agreement was global and covered all liquidated and unliquidated claims, that 
there was "a full settlement of all obligations, disputes and other matters," and an 
accord and satisfaction. 
Whether Jenson and MSF disputed that the loan was owing or what the 
amount owing under the loan is immaterial. In order to establish an accord and 
satisfaction in Utah, the law requires, among other things, "an unliquidated claim 
or a bona fide dispute over the amount due." ProMax, 2000 UT 4, \ 20, 998 P.2d 
at 259 (citing Marton Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607, 609-610 (Utah 1985) 
(emphasis added)). The Settlement Agreement is not merely a release of claims 
between Bodell, Jenson and MSF arising under the loan, but also settles all 
claims between the parties, including "allegations of fraud" and other claims 
"whether . . . liquidated or unliquidated." 
The language of the Settlement Agreement also clearly demonstrates an 
accord and satisfaction because without an accord and satisfaction several 
paragraphs in the Settlement Agreement would be redundant. Paragraph 2 
contains two parts, designated (a) and (b). Part (a) states that Bodell releases 
MSF and Jenson from any and all claims and obligations, including the loans. 
Part (b) states that the loans are "fully satisfied and repaid in full." Obviously, 
Parts (a) and (b) were intended to accomplish two different things. Part (b) is not 
merely a release of MSF and Jenson. That was already provided in Part (a). Part 
(b) must have been intended to mean something different than Part (a) - there is 
no other way to reconcile these provisions. See LDS Hosp. v. Capitol Life Ins, 
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Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988) ("It is axiomatic that a contract should be 
interpreted so as to harmonize all of its provisions and all of its terms, which 
terms should be given effect if it is possible to do so."). Part (b) provides that the 
debt is "fully satisfied and repaid in full." The inescapable conclusion is that 
there was an accord and satisfaction. The absence of any provision reserving 
rights against third parties from the Settlement Agreement further demonstrates 
the intent that all loans were "fully satisfied and repaid in full." 
Because of the clarity of the Settlement Agreement, "extrinsic evidence 
need not and should be considered. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 
(Utah 1991) ("A court may only consider extrinsic evidence, if after careful 
consideration, the contract language is ambiguous or uncertain."). There is no 
reservation of rights against others. The only conclusion is that claims based on 
the Bodell Loan are extinguished and satisfied and cannot now be asserted against 
Bank One or anyone else. Bodell has no remaining claims on the Bodell Loan. 
If, however, the Court finds it necessary to review extrinsic evidence, the 
clear intent of Bodell, MSF and Jenson that the Settlement Agreement constitute 
an accord and satisfaction is evidenced by Jenson's statements in the Criminal 
Plea: 
7. On March 18, 2003, Mr. Jensom MSF 
Properties and Bodell entered into a settlement 
agreement pursuant to which Mr. Jenson and MSF 
Properties made a $3 million payment to Bodell and 
Bodell signed an accord and satisfaction in which he 
waived all of his claims against Mr. Jenson and MSF 
Properties relating to transaction among them. 
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8. In May, 2008, Mr. Jenson, MSF Properties 
and Bodell entered into an agreement (the "Bodell 
Restitution Agreement") pursuant to which Mr. Jenson 
and MSF Properties have agreed to provide additional 
consideration to Bodell which Bodell has confirmed will 
be satisfactory to him as full restitution from Mr. Jenson 
in connection with the loans made by Bodell to MSF 
Properties and Mr. Jenson. Bodell has also confirmed 
that he fully supports the plea arrangement provided 
herein. 
(Bank One's Addendum 1 at Ex. 4; Criminal Plea at 4 (emphasis added).) 
Bodell confuses the doctrines of accord and satisfaction with release and 
misconstrues Bank One's argument as relying on the release contained in the 
Settlement Agreement, when in fact Bank One relies on the accord and 
satisfaction contained in the Settlement Agreement. Release is a different 
doctrine and concept and should not be confused with accord and satisfaction. A 
release excuses performance by a party. Accord and satisfaction extinguishes a 
claim. 
A release is a waiver of claims against a party. Black's Law Dictionary 
1292 (7th Ed. 1999) (A release is "the act of giving up a right or claim to the 
person against whom it could have been enforced"). An accord and satisfaction, 
on the other hand, "arises when the parties to a contract agree that a different 
performance, to be made in substitution of the performance originally agreed 
upon, will discharge the obligation created under the original agreement." 
ProMax, 2000 UT 4, \ 20, 998 P2d at 259. The U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois clearly explained the difference: "There are two 
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different things: an accord and satisfaction is a contractual method of 
discharging a debt or claim by some performance other than that which was 
originally due; a release is a contract whereby a party abandons a claim or 
relinquishes a right that could be asserted against another." Doyle's Construction 
& Remodeling, Inc. v. Wendy's International, Inc., 144 F.Supp. 2d 969, 976 (N.D. 
111. 2001); see also Thompson v. Nicholson, 1994 WL 44428 *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1994) (Release and accord and satisfaction "differ from one another in that a 
release is a relinquishment by the creditor or holder of a right, and an accord and 
satisfaction is a discharge of a claim or demand by or for the debtor or person 
liable, by some means other than its full performance."). 
An accord and satisfaction is a substitute agreement similar to a novation. 
The Settlement Agreement replaces the obligations under the note. The 
Settlement Agreement expressly states that the loan obligations are "fully 
satisfied and repaid in full." The note is discharged by the Settlement 
Agreement. There is no longer any obligation owing on the note. If Jenson had 
failed to pay the $3,000,000.00 pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, Bodell's 
remedy would have been for breach of the Settlement Agreement, not to sue on 
the note. Upon reaching an accord and satisfaction, the note is gone. It is 
discharged. 
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B. The Accord and Satisfaction Applies to Bank One Because It 
Extinguished All Claims. 
Bodell argues that even if an accord and satisfaction was reached as 
between Bodell, MSF and Jenson, that accord and satisfaction would not apply to 
Bank One because Bank One was not a party to the Settlement Agreement, 
relying on Messick v. PHD Trucking Service, Inc., 615 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1980) 
and Killian v. Oberhansly, 743 P.2d 1200 (Utah 1987). Neither Messick nor 
Killian stands for the proposition that an accord and satisfaction does not apply to 
a third party. 
In Killian, the plaintiff and defendant dissolved their dairy partnership by 
entering into new agreements. The plaintiff subsequently learned that the 
partnership incurred a loss of over $100,000. The plaintiff asked the defendant to 
contribute to the partnership losses. The defendant declined, the plaintiff sued 
him, and the defendant argued that an accord and satisfaction occurred with the 
new agreements. The trial court disagreed and held that the defendant was liable 
for half of the partnership's losses. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's 
decision because, inter alia, the new agreements "did not purport to be an accord 
and satisfaction of all liabilities between the parties under the partnership 
agreement." Id. at 1201. The court said nothing about whether a non-party to an 
agreement can or cannot benefit from an accord and satisfaction. 
In Messick, the plaintiff bought a truck from the defendant and then leased 
it back to the defendant. The plaintiff eventually sold his truck back to the 
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defendants for a total that, according to a written agreement, "was in 
consideration of defendant's acquiring all equity and interest that plaintiff had in 
the vehicle." The plaintiff then sued the defendant for money owed on the truck 
under the preexisting lease agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant. 
The trial court held for the defendant, holding that the parties entered into a 
purchase agreement for the truck that was an accord and satisfaction. The Utah 
Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision, stating that "Defendant failed 
to prove that it had made known to plaintiff an intent to consider plaintiffs 
release of defendant's equity . . . as an accord and satisfaction of all plaintiff's 
claims against defendant . . . .," i.e., a claim for unpaid amounts under the lease 
agreement. Messick, 615 P.2d at 1278. As with Killian, this case says nothing 
about whether a non-party to an agreement can or cannot benefit from an accord 
and satisfaction. 
Other cases have found that an accord and satisfaction bars claims against 
third parties who are not parties to the agreement creating the accord and 
satisfaction. In Luxemburg v. Can-Tex Industries, 257 N.W.2d 804, 807-808 
(Minn. 1977), the Court ruled, "if the injured party has accepted satisfaction in 
full for the injury suffered by him, the law will not permit him to recover again 
for the same injury . . . ." In a footnote, the Court acknowledged that an amount 
less than the full damages may represent "full compensation" where the lesser 
amount reflects a discount due to the fact that liability is disputed. Id. at n.l; see 
also Havard v. Kemper National Insurance Companies, 945 F. Supp. 953 (D. 
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Miss. 1995) (An accord and satisfaction between the insured and the insurer 
discharged all claims of plaintiff and therefore plaintiffs claims against 
appraisers were dismissed). 
If the loan has been satisfied, whether by accord and satisfaction or 
otherwise, no damages are suffered. Since Bodell has no damages, it cannot 
make a claim against anyone, including third parties such as Bank One. 
C. The Liability Reform Act Has No Applicability to This Case. 
Bodell relies on Section 78-27-42 of the Utah Liability Reform Act which 
provides that "[a] release given by a person seeking recovery to one or more 
defendants does not discharge any other defendant unless the release so 
provides." Appellant's Brief at 23-24. Bodell's reliance on the Liability Reform 
Act is misplaced and irrelevant to the issue presented by Bank One. Bank One 
does not argue that the release by Bodell of MSF and Jenson contained in the 
Settlement Agreement operates as a release of Bank One. Rather, Bank One 
maintains that the Settlement Agreement constitutes an accord and satisfaction of 
the obligations owed to Bodell. 
D. Application of the Doctrine of Accord and Satisfaction is not 
Unfair. 
Bodell argues that application of the accord and satisfaction doctrine would 
be fundamentally unfair, suggesting that historically courts have not clearly 
distinguished accord and satisfaction from release and the Utah Liability Reform 
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Act "appears" to have been intended to alter the common law rule of accord and 
satisfaction. Id. at 24. 
Bodell does not - and cannot - point to any language in the Liability 
Reform Act supporting the argument that the Liability Reform Act also applies to 
accord and satisfaction. Bodell's argument is basically that because these 
doctrines overlap and Bodell believes lawyers who draft agreements may have 
been incorrectly assuming that the Act includes accord and satisfaction, the Act 
should be interpreted to include accord and satisfaction. This is not a sufficient 
argument to justify interpretation of the Act to include accord and satisfaction. 
II. EVEN IF THE ACCORD AND SATISFACTION RULING OF THE 
DISTRICT COURT IS NOT AFFIRMED, SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 
FAVOR OF BANK ONE SHOULD BE UPHELD UNDER THE 
"AFFIRM ON ANY GROUND" DOCTRINE 
Utah appellate courts "will affirm a trial court's decision whenever [they] 
can do so as a proper ground, even though it was not the ground on which the 
trial court relied in its ruling.'' Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neeley 
Construction Co., 677 P.2d 1120, 1123 (Utah 1984). The law is well settled that: 
The appellate court will affirm the judgment, order, or 
decree appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal 
ground or theory apparent on the record, even though 
such ground or theory differs from that stated by the 
trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action, and this 
is true even though such ground or theory is not urged 
or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the 
lower court, and was not considered or passed on by the 
lower court. 
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A.J. Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Assoc., Inc., 461 P.2d 290, 293 (Utah 
1969) (emphasis added); see also Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ff 12-15, 52 P.3d 
1158 (affirming the rule cited in A.J. Limb).4 
The reasons and policy considerations behind the "affirm on any ground" 
doctrine are obviously judicial economy and to speed the administration of 
justice. Id. f 13 n.3, 1162 n.3 (stating that the goal of judicial economy is 
embodied in the "affirm on any ground" rule). 
Bank One sought summary judgment against Bodell in the trial court on 
seven separate and independent theories: (i) There was no misrepresentation of a 
past or presently existing fact; (ii) Any representations were not false; (iii) Any 
reliance by Bodell was unreasonable; (iv) All claims were previously satisfied by 
the accord and satisfaction; (v) Bank One did not have the required pecuniary 
interest in the Bodell Loan (negligent misrepresentation claim only); (vi) Bank 
One was not in a superior position to ascertain the facts (negligent 
misrepresentation claim only); and (vii) Bodell was not a foreseeable recipient of 
the alleged Bank One letter. Each of these theories was fully briefed and argued 
Bailey also addresses several other points under the "affirm on any ground 
doctrine" but those points are not relevant to this appeal (if the alternate ground 
for affirmance may come as a surprise to the parties, in certain circumstances the 
parties should be given an opportunity to address and argue the alternate grounds; 
the reviewing court may not make findings of fact and cannot consider evidence 
to find facts). Id. at f 19, 1164. The alternate grounds asserted by Bank One 
were fully briefed and argued in the District Court and do not require any new 
argument and do not require the appellate court to make any new findings of fact. 
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to the trial court. The entire briefing by all parties on these issues is provided to 
the Court in Bank One Addendum 2. 
The trial court granted Bank One's motion for summary judgment on the 
accord and satisfaction theory and declined to rule on the other theories. 
The Bodell case is a textbook example of where the "affirm on any ground" 
doctrine should be applied. If this Court determines that the District Court erred 
in granting summary judgment on the accord and satisfaction argument, then this 
Court should consider the remaining summary judgment arguments and determine 
if summary judgment in favor of Bank One should be entered based on any one of 
these alternative arguments. 
Bank One submits that summary judgment is proper on each of these 
arguments and the ruling of the District Court should be affirmed on any one of 
these alternate grounds. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION TO EXCLUDE THE NEW 
DAMAGE THEORIES IS NOT RIPE FOR APPEAL 
It is well established that an appellate court will not consider an issue on 
appeal if the issue is not ripe. An issue is not ripe if there is any future scenario 
in which the appellate court would not decide the issue. 
In Pett v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 2005 UT 2, 106 P.3d 705, the defendant was 
granted leave to amend an answer to plead an affirmative defense of "after-
acquired evidence." The plaintiff brought an interlocutory appeal challenging the 
decision granting leave to amend and also requesting the Supreme Court to 
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determine whether Utah law recognizes the affirmative defense. Id. \ 3, 706. 
The Supreme Court limited its decision to determining whether there had been an 
abuse of discretion in allowing the amendment. The Court stated: 
We ... decline the invitation to express additional views 
about the scope and application of the after-acquired 
evidence defense. To do so would be premature and at 
odds with our time-honored practice of deciding only 
questions which are ripe. . . . 
This case comes to us on interlocutory appeal. It has 
not matured to the extent that we can know with 
certainty the facts and law which shape its final 
outcome. As such, any direction we may provide 
concerning the characteristics of the after-acquired 
evidence defense would be little more than an advisory 
opinion and may ultimately prove to be irrelevant, or 
even flawed, after a final judgment has been rendered in 
this case. 
Id. HI 4-5, 706. 
Similarly, in State v. Ortiz, 1999 UT 84, 987 P.2d 39, the Supreme Court 
declined to hear the challenge raised by defendants in a criminal matter who 
argued that there were constitutional defects in the sentencing structure 
applicable to the crimes with which they were charged (concerning whether a 
particular sentence could be imposed by a less than unanimous jury). The 
Supreme Court explained its holding that the issue was not ripe as follows: 
[T]here are several possible circumstances under which 
we would not need to address the constitutionality of 
[the statute]. Allen and Ortiz may both be found not 
guilty; Allen and Ortiz may both be found guilty and 
unanimous juries could agree that life without the 
possibility of parole is the proper sentence; Allen and 
Ortiz may both be found guilty but there might not be 
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ten votes to sentence either defendant to life without the 
possibility of parole; and finally, Allen and Ortiz may 
both be found guilty of a lesser offense. 
Id. Tj 4, 40-41. See also Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 
U.S. 568, 580-581 (1985) (claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon 
"contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not 
occur at all") (citations omitted); Texas v. U.S., 523 U.S. 296, 302 (1998) (too 
speculative whether issue presented will ever need solving and therefore deeming 
issue not ripe for adjudication). 
In this case, there are several possible circumstances under which this 
Court would not need to address the damages issues, even if the case were 
remanded for trial. The trial court might enter summary judgment for Defendants 
on one of the alternate grounds, the case could settle, or the jury might find 
against Bodell. Under any of these possibilities, the issue of damages would 
never be reached, in which case any decision by this Court on the pending 
damages issue would be merely advisory. 
The arguments of Bodell on damages are not ripe and should be dismissed. 
IV. IF THIS COURT FINDS THE ISSUE IS RIPE FOR REVIEW ON 
APPEAL, THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION EXCLUDING THE 
NEW DAMAGE THEORIES SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
Bodell claims the District Court erred in excluding new damage theories in 
a report first offered by its damages expert, Merrill Weight, after the close of fact 
discovery. Bodell argues that the report was timely, the theories were valid and, 
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even if Bodell did improperly submit new theories, the District Court should have 
imposed a "less draconian sanction." Appellant's Brief at 26. 
The District Court's decision to exclude the new damages theories should 
be affirmed for two reasons. First, the theories were wholly new and raised new 
fact issues that had not been explored while fact discovery was open. Litigating 
the theories would have required the re-opening of fact discovery and a 
substantial delay in the trial date would have resulted. Thus, the decision to 
exclude comported with sound case management practice and fairness and it 
certainly was not an abuse of discretion, particularly in light of the District 
Court's willingness to allow Bodell additional time to prepare a second report 
from Weight based on the one damage theory that had been properly disclosed. 
Additionally, the District Court's decision to exclude the new theories can be 
affirmed on the alternative ground that the new theories are not allowable under 
applicable law or do not comport with the facts in the record. 
A. The District Court Properly Excluded The New Damage 
Theories. 
Throughout discovery in this case, Bodell maintained that its damages were 
the amount of money loaned, $4 million, plus interest at the legal rate. A month 
after the close of discovery, in submitting an expert witness report, Bodell for the 
first time asserted new theories of damages which skyrocketed Bodell's damage 
claims to as much as $18,970,571. Additional fact discovery would be required 
for Bank One to respond to these new theories. Allowing the additional 
31 
discovery would have resulted in rescheduling the trial date. The trial court 
properly ruled that these new damage theories were not timely, were not properly 
raised, and struck the expert witness report. This sanction was appropriate and 
justified under the circumstances. Bodeli was permitted to submit a second 
expert witness report demonstrating calculation of damages of $4 million plus 
interest at the legal rate. 
1. BodelPs Discovery Responses Consistently Disclosed That It 
Was Seeking Only $4 Million Plus Interest At The Statutory 
Rate Less Payments Received. 
On January 27, 2004, Bodeli served its Rule 26(a) Initial Disclosures, 
stating in part: "Bodeli's damages constitute the funds advanced, together with 
interest at the legal rate, less the payment received from MSF." (Bank One 
Addendum 1 at Ex. 6.) Bodeli never amended or supplemented these disclosures 
to include other damages calculations. 
On September 22, 2004, Bodeli provided its most expansive explanation of 
its damages in responses to the first discovery requests of Defendant Mark 
Robbins, which asked Bodeli to describe in detail its damages and give a detailed 
calculation: "Bodeli has been damaged in the principal sum of $4 million 
representing the amount that Bodeli was fraudulently induced to loan to MSF to 
in turn loan those funds to Robbins. Bodeli also contends that it is entitled to 
recover interest at the legal rate." (Bank One Addendum 1 at Ex. 7.) Bodeli 
never supplemented or amended this response. 
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Similarly, on April 9, 2004, Bodell served responses to Defendant 
Cherokee & Walker's first set of discovery, asking the amount Bodell claimed 
was owing by Cherokee & Walker: "Bodell contends it is entitled to recover 
from Cherokee & Walker the principal sum of $4 million representing the amount 
that Bodell was fraudulently induced to loan to Robbins and by which amount 
Bodell contends Cherokee & Walker was unjustly enriched. Bodell contends it is 
also entitled to recover interest at the legal rate." (Bank One Addendum 1 at Ex. 
8.) Bodell never supplemented this response. 
On June 14, 2004, Bodell responded to a Request for Admission from Bank 
One as follows: 
REQUEST [FOR ADMISSION1 NO. 7: Admit that if 
Bodell prevails on all claims, the only amounts Bodell is 
entitled to recover from Bank One are the principal 
amount outstanding on the $4 million Bodell Loan, 
interest on that amount at the rate provided in Utah 
Code §§ 15-1-1 and 15-1-4, and costs of court. 
RESPONSE: Bodell admits that at this time he is not 
seeking punitive damages against Bank One. However, 
discovery is in its infancy and Bank One had not been 
forthcoming with all of the information requested. 
Accordingly, Bodell reserves the right to amend the 
complaint and seek punitive damages should subsequent 
discovery so justify 
(Bank One Addendum 1 at Ex. 9.) 
On August 5, 2004, Bodell served a supplemental response to Bank One's 
Request for Admission No. 7, just described, as follows: 
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE: Admit. Discovery is 
in its infancy and Bank One has not been forthcoming 
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with all of the information requested. Accordingly, 
Bodell reserves the right to amend its Complaint to seek 
punitive damages should subsequent discovery justify 
such relief. 
(Bank One Addendum 1 at Ex. 10.) Bodell did not further supplement this 
response. 
The foregoing demonstrates that throughout the course of discovery, 
Bodell clearly and repeatedly gave a single description of its damages, which was 
$4 million plus interest at the statutory rate. 
2. After Fact Discovery Closed, Bodell's Expert Report Raised 
New Damage Theories Based on Facts That Had Not Been The 
Subject of Discovery. 
Weight's report was served June 11, 2007, almost a month after fact 
discovery had closed on May 18, 2007. Expert Report of Merrill Weight, June 
11, 2007. (R. 2992-3018.) It included several alternative new theories for 
calculation of damages including the "Benefit of the Bargain Rule," the 
"Modified Benefit of the Bargain Rule," the "Comparable Rate of Return" theory, 
and consequential damages. (R. 2992-3002.) The new theories were not simply 
new legal theories applied to facts that had been the subject of discovery. 
Instead, they raised whole new areas of potential factual disputes that had not 
been investigated before fact discovery closed. 
As argued below, the "Benefit of the Bargain Rule" and "Modified Benefit 
of the Bargain Rule" theories should not be applied in the context of a loan. (R. 
2884-2885; Mem. in Supp. of (1) Mot. to Exclude Expert Test, of Merrill Weight 
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and (2) Mot. to Reopen Fact Discov. and Extend Expert Deadlines at 4-5.) See, 
e.g., McLean v. Charles Ellis Realty, Inc., 76 P.3d 661, 667 (Ore. Ct. App. 2003) 
(rejecting a benefit of the bargain measure of damages for fraud in inducing a 
loan, explaining that the "benefit-of-the-bargain method [is not] particularly apt 
where, as here, no property changed hands and a value comparison is not 
available."). 
This measure of damages only makes sense when a tangible asset is sold or 
transferred. If applied to a loan, it would require determination of the fair market 
value of a loan as actually made and the fair market value of that same loan made 
based on the alleged misrepresentations.5 Fair market value would be what 
someone would pay to purchase the loan from the lender. Determination of this 
fair market value would require an analysis of the terms of the loan, 
creditworthiness of the borrower, sources of repayment, credit history of the 
borrower, and similar factors. This measure makes no sense in a loan transaction. 
Benefit of the bargain is not an appropriate measure of damages for a loan 
transaction. 
5
 "[I]n an action for fraud and deceit the measure of damages is the difference 
between the actual value of what the party received and the value thereof if it had 
been as represented; this is the benefit of the bargain rule." Lamb v. Bangart, 525 
P.2d 602, 609 (Utah 1974); see also Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 151 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992) ("[BJenefit of the bargain damages are, in effect, a refund to the 
purchaser of the overpayment in order to bring the effective purchase in line with 
the actual value received. Both parties thereby received the full benefit of the 
bargain."). 
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If a benefit of the bargain measure of damages was allowed, it would 
require significant factual discovery into the factors listed above. Because this 
theory was never disclosed in initial disclosures or discovery, none of this 
discovery was done. 
Bodell's expert witness report also includes $127,281.18 in "consequential 
damages" representing "the amount of interest Bodell was required to pay on 
money it was forced to borrow against its line of credit as a result of not 
receiving the payments promised in connection with the August 2000 Jenson 
loan." (R. 3000; Weight Report at 7.) Bodell specifically conceded that this is a 
new fact that had not previously been disclosed. (R. 3394; Bodell Opp'n to Mot. 
to Exclude Weight's Report at 2 n.4.) No discovery was conducted on this 
undisclosed issue. 
Bodell's "Comparable Rate of Return" analysis estimates what Bodell 
"could have achieved . . . had it invested elsewhere the four million dollars it was 
instead induced to loan to Jenson." (R. 3002; Weight Report at 9.) Weight then 
"assume[s] a rate of 18% as a comparable rate of return available through other 
investments." Id. With this assumption of an 18% return, Weight calculates 
Bodell's damages at $7,510,352.96. Id. The 18% rate of return assumption is 
based on loans made by MJB Ltd., a Bodell Family Partnership, and James H. 
Bodell, a Bodell shareholder, not on loans by Bodell. (R. 3001; Weight Report at 
8.) Again, no discovery was conducted on these issues because the theory was 
never disclosed. 
36 
Bodell conceded at oral argument in the trial court that Defendants would 
need at least some additional fact discovery on its new theories: "I agree with Mr. 
Tufts, I can see his position, I will concede that were I in that chair, I would have 
asked different questions of Mr. Weight and Mr. Bodell in their depositions about 
the consequential damages and the interest rate, the interest that we were drawing 
on . . ." (R. 6257.) 
Allowance of these new theories would have required the re-opening of 
discovery and significant new discovery by the Defendants. This additional 
discovery would have resulted in a substantial postponement of the trial. It was 
well within the discretion of the Court to deny these new damage theories under 
these circumstances. See A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen 
Constr., 1999 UT App 87, If 36, 977 P.2d 518, 526 ("Because the trial judge deals 
primarily with the parties and the discovery process, he or she has great latitude 
in determining the most efficient and fair manner to conduct the court's 
business."); Geiserman v. MacDonald, 893 F.2d 787, 791-792 (5th Cir. 1990) 
(excluding expert witness testimony because it was not timely provided before 
the fact discovery deadline, because it would have required opposing counsel to 
incur additional litigation expense, and because it would have delayed the trial); 
Finwall v. City of Chicago, 239 F.R.D. 504, 507 (N.D. 111. 2006) (excluding 
expert witnesses not timely disclosed because there was no meaningful 
opportunity to submit rebuttal expert reports and reopen discovery before trial). 
See also Robert Matthew Lovelin, A Practitioner's Guide: Federal Rule of Civil 
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Procedure 26(a) -Automatic Disclosure, 47 Syracuse L. Rev. 225 (1996) (stating 
that a district court may also sanction a party's failure to comply with expert 
disclosure requirements by excluding evidence in order to "highlight the 
importance of Rule 26(a)(2), and to serve as an incentive to comply with the 
rule"). 
3. The District Court Properly Excluded BodelPs Late Disclosed 
Damage Theories. 
The District Court found "that the defendants will suffer prejudice if 
Bodell were allowed to present these damages theories at trial because these 
claims and the bases for them were not disclosed during fact discovery and 
defendants are now unable to conduct fact discovery to rebut those theories. 
Bodell has offered no legitimate excuse for not disclosing these theories prior to 
the close of fact discovery." (R. 4766-4769; Ord. Granting Def. Robbins' Motion 
to Exclude Expert Testimony of Merrill Weight at 2.) This holding was fully 
justified. See Utah. R. Civ. P. Rule 37(f) ("If a party fails to disclose a witness, 
document or other material as required by Rule 26(a) or Rules 26(e)(1), or to 
amend a prior response to discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), that party shall 
not be permitted to use the witness, document or other material at any hearing 
unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause for the 
failure to disclose."); Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1999 UT App. 80, | 26, 
977 P.2d 508, 514 (the trial court was well within its right to limit an expert 
witnesses' testimony because party failed to supplement interrogatories); Am. 
38 
Interstate Mortg. Corp. v. Edwards, 2002 UT App. 16, 41 P.3d 1142 (refusing to 
allow evidence relating to the total amount owed by the defendant where plaintiff 
failed to supplement its response to defendant's request for production); Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 37, Advisory Committee Notes ("This automatic sanction provides strong 
inducement for disclosure of material that the disclosing party would expect to 
use as evidence.").6 
Clear prejudice to Defendants would have resulted from the introduction of 
substantial new factual issues that had not been investigated while fact discovery 
was open. Although Bodell repeatedly points out that Weight's report was served 
with seven weeks of expert discovery remaining, it omits to mention that fact 
discovery had been closed for almost a month. Defendants would have been 
forced to reopen fact discovery or go to trial unprepared on the new theories. 
Indeed, Defendants moved, in the alternative to striking the new theories in the 
Weight report, to re-open fact discovery. (R. 2871-2873.) Additionally, if fact 
discovery had been re-opened, the District Court said at oral argument that the 
trial setting would have to be postponed: u[W]e've got a trial date and it seems to 
me that this is an extensive period of time [for the additional fact discovery] and 
if we end up striking that trial date because of additional discovery, we're going 
6
 "Interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are persuasive where 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are 'substantially similar' to the federal rules." 
Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 872 P.2d 1036, 1039 n.5 (Utah 1994). 
Rule 37(f), Utah R. Civ. P., and Rule 37(c)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P., are substantially 
similar. 
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to be moving it back into probably March of next year, that's where we are in our 
calendar right now for that length of trial." (R. 6257.) 
The District Court's order excluding Weight's novel theories was amply 
justified, particularly in light of the applicable standard of review. "A trial judge 
is given a great deal of latitude in determining the most fair and efficient manner 
to conduct court business. The trial judge is in the best position to evaluate the 
status of his cases, as well as the attitudes, motives, and credibility of the 
parties." Morton v. Continental Baking Company, 938 P.2d 271, 275 (Utah 
1997). The Utah Supreme Court also held: 
Because trial courts must deal first hand with the parties 
and the discovery process, they are given broad 
discretion regarding the imposition of discovery 
sanctions. Thus, we have long held that we will not 
interfere unless abuse of that discretion is clearly 
shown. We will find that a trial court has abused its 
discretion in choosing which sanction to impose only if 
there is either an erroneous conclusion of law or no 
evidentiary basis for the trial court's ruling. 
Id. at 274 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The District Court's 
decision here was not an abuse of discretion, nor was its decision "draconian," as 
Bodell argues. The court was simply acting to protect Defendants against 
obvious prejudice. Although not required to do so, the District Court made 
accommodation for Bodell to prepare an amended (and late) report by Weight that 
calculated damages based on the damage theory previously disclosed. 
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B. The District Court's Decision Excluding The New Damage 
Theories Should Be Affirmed On The Alternative Ground That 
The New Theories Contradict Applicable Law 
In the event this Court finds there was an abuse of discretion, the District 
Court's decision should nevertheless be affirmed on the alternate ground that 
Weight's new theories are not supported by applicable law or are contradicted by 
the facts in the record. See Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neeley Construction 
Co., 677 P.2d 1120, 1123 (Utah 1984) (appellate courts "will affirm a trial court's 
decision whenever [they] can do so as a proper ground, even though it was not the 
ground on which the trial court relied in its ruling"). The "Benefit of the 
Bargain" rule and "Modified Benefit of the Bargain" rule proposed by Weight 
contradict recognized Utah law. The "Reasonable Rate of Return" theory is not 
proper because evidence in the record contradicts the assumptions made in the 
theory. These arguments were raised in the trial court but were not decided 
because they were rendered moot by the District Court's exclusion on other 
grounds. The arguments may be found in Bank One's Addendum 3. 
CONCLUSION 
The issues raised in Bodell's appeal fail for multiple reasons. The 
Settlement Agreement between Bodell, MSF and Jenson was clearly and 
unequivocally an accord and satisfaction. Bodell received $3 million, in addition 
to other previous payments. An accord and satisfaction extinguishes all claims -
the obligation is paid in full and no longer exists. No claims can be brought 
against anyone, including Bank One. 
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If this Court determines that the District Court erred in granting summary 
judgment on the accord and satisfaction, then this Court should apply the "affirm 
on any ground" doctrine and affirm the action of the District Court on any one of 
the other six summary judgment arguments presented to the District Court. 
BodelPs appeal of the exclusion of damages evidence is not ripe for appeal. 
In any event, the District Court appropriately excluded the expert report. The 
decision of the District Court granting summary judgment should be affirmed. 
Dated: June 30, 2008 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
'John A. Beckstead 
H. Douglas Owens 
Romaine C. Marshall 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., as successor 
by merger to Bank One, N.A. 
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SCHEDULE OF BANK ONE ADDENDA 
1. Key Documents (Attached to Appellee's Brief) 
2. Trial Court Pleadings on Summary Judgment Motions (Separate Volume) 
3. Trial Court Pleadings on Motion to Strike Expert Witness Report of Merrill 
Weight (Separate Volume) 
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THIS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (this "Agreement') b entered into this 18th day of March, 
2003, by and among BODELL CONSTRUCTJON COMPANY, a Utah corporation.("BCC"), MICHAEL 
BODELL, an individual ("Bodcir'), MARC S. JENSON, an individual ("Jensen"), and MSF 
PROPERTIES, L.C., a Utah limited liability company ("MSF"). 
WHEREAS, in June and August of 2000, BCC made certain Joans to MSF (the ^Loans'1)', arid 
WHEREAS, Jenson personally guaranteed the obligations of MSF under the Loans; and 
WHEREAS, MSF has made partial payments against the amounts outstanding under the Loans, 
but is currently uVdefault under the Loans; and 
WHEREAS, the parties now desire to achieve a full settlement of all obligations, disputes and 
other matters outstanding between them, including, but not limited to the Loans; 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises set forth above and the covenants and 
obligations set forth below, and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of 
which art hereby acknowledged, the parties hereby agree as follows: 
L Contemporaneous with the execution and delivery of tills Agreement, MSF has caused 
S3,000,000 in immediately available funds to be delivered to BCC. BCC hereby acknowledges receipt of 
such funds. 
2. • Each of Bodell-and BCC, for himself, itself their affiliates and for all persons or entities 
claiming by, through or under him, it or them, hereby (a) releases, acquits, waives and forever discharges 
MSF, its affiliates and their respective members, managers, officers, employees and agents (each, 
including without limitation Jenson, an "MSF Part/') from any and all claims, allegations of fraud, 
charges, demands, losses,- damages, obligations, liabilities, grievances, causes of action, or suits at law 
and equity of whatsoever kind and nature, expenses, costs and attorneys fees, whether known or unknown, 
suspected or unsuspected, liquidated or unliquidated (each, a "CZffirxf'), arising out of all past affiliations 
and transactions among Bodell, BCCand any MSF Party, including, but not limited to, the Loans and all 
related arrangements and transactions, (b) without limiting the generality of the foregoing, acknowledges 
and agrees that the obligations of the MSF Parties in connection with the Loans, including all principal 
and interest that may have been deemed to have accrued thereon, are hereby deemed fully satisfied and 
repaid in full; provided \\\z\ suoh releases shall not apply to any obligation of MSF or Jenson set forth in 
mis Agreement to be performed or observed after the execution and delivery hereof, 
3. Each of Jenson and MSF, for himself, itself, their affiliates and for all persons or entities 
claiming by, through or under him, it or them, hereby (a) releases, acquits, waives and forever discharges 
BCC, its affiliates and their respective officers, directors, employees and agents (each, including without 
limitation Bodell, a "Bodell Partf')> from any and all Claims arising out of all past affiliations and 
transactions among Bodell, BCC and any MSF Party including, but not limited to, the Loans and all 
related arrangements and transactions; provided that juch releases shajl not apply TO any obligation of 
BCC or Bodell set forth in this Agreement to be performed or observed after the execution and delivery 
hereof. 
4. Each of the parties hereto agrees that, except as necessary to enforce the provisions hereof it 
shall keep confidential the execution, terms and existence of tin's Agreement, the consideration exchanged 
herein, and all other matters in connection with this Agreement; provided thai any party may (upon 
performance by the parties of the respective deliveries to be made hereunder) disclose that MSF, Jenson, 
Bodell and BCC have definitively settled all matters between them as of me date hereof and provided, 
further, that each party may disclose such kerns in confidence as appropriate to their rcspcctiYcrtax advisors. 
ADD 01 
5. Each of the parties hereto understand and agree thai this is a mutual release of claims and 
that, following execution of this document, no Bodell Party shall have any claim against an MSF Parry and 
no MSF Parry shall have any claim against a Bodell Party, except with respect MSF's requirement to pay 
BCC S3 million asset forth herein. 
6. Tho parties shall execute and detiver all documents, provide all information, and take or 
forbear from all such action as may be necessary or appropriate to achieve the purposes of this Agreement 
7. Each of BCC and MSF represents and warrants to the other parties hereto that (a) this 
Agreement has been duly approved by all necessary corporate or limited liability company action and tliat 
the person executing this Agreement on its behalf has been duly auftorized to do so and (b) they have had 
opportunity to consult with legal counsel of their choosing in connection with entering into this Agreement 
1. This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of tho Stale of Utah. This Agreement 
shiJl be binding upon and shall inure to ihc benefit of the parties and their heirs, successors and assigns. 
In the event legal action is commenced by any party to enforce or interpret this Agreement, the prevailing 
party or parties in any such action shall be entitled to recover from the non-preyailing party or parties its 
or their reasonable aitorncy fees and costs, This Agreement dial] be construed as though all parties had 
drafted ft. This Agreement sets forth the entire understanding and agreement between the parties with 
respect to the subject matter hereof, and supersedes all prioT negotiations, representations, understandings, 
agreements or arrangements between them, whether written or oral, with respect to the subject matter 
hereof. The parties agree that this Agreement may be executed in multiple counterparts and, upon such 
execution, all the counterparts taken together shall constitute one and the same agreement Counteroarts 
and signatures transmitted by facsimOe^hall be valid.and effective as originals. 
(5> | p fb-t ArY ££M*J B.CC \S, £ <£ Ct>yz.*£> T° 
eenvC^ THE" •FwkS fcr h £ A $ V C T of^Hi 
i s MVU_ t+>D VDID. 4\iQ-Mk 
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MSF Properties, L»C. 
ADDD3 MS 
Tab 2 
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W E A L T H M A N A G E M E N T 
August 22, 2000 
To; Whom it may concern ^ <££ 
Re: MadTrax Group, LLC 
Gentlemen; 
MadTrax Group, LLC (the "Company") and its individual members 
Mark Robbins and Marc Jenson (the "Members") "will be depositing $165,000,000 into 
Bank One, Utah NA, The funding is coming from a loan agreement between MadTrax 
Group, LLC, a Utah limited liability'company and Arimex Investments^ LTD., a 
Bahamian, corporation. The si?m of $165,000,000 will be deposited into an interest 
bearing account in the name of the Company and managed by its Members. 
Should you have any questions with respect to this matter, please contact the 
Under&igned, 
"TOSMrkdvisor. 
Private Banking .GroOp 
Bodell v. Robbins 
Deposition Exhibit No. 402 
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EXPERT WITNESS REPORT 
Bodell Construction Company, a Utah corporation 
v. 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., et. al. 
Submitted by: 
Merrill Weight 
Date of Report 
June 11,2007 
I. INTRODUCTION 
I am the Secretary and Treasurer at Bodell Construction Company 
("Bodell Construction"). In that capacity, I have been asked to calculate the damages 
suffered by Bodell Construction as a result of the events described in a lawsuit filed in 
Third District Court, State of Utah, styled Bodell Construction Company v. MarkH. 
Robbins, et al, Civil Case Number 030917018. 
This report and the attached schedules describe and reflect my work in connection 
with calculating the damages, summarize my opinions concerning the amount of those 
damages, and provide the bases for those opinions. The opinions and findings expressed 
herein are based upon my own investigation and work to date, as well as the facts of the 
discreet transactions at issue in this case as I understand them. My opinions and findings 
are also based upon my review of the documents and information itemized in Exhibit 1 of 
this report. 
In preparing this report, I have made no assumptions concerning who is liable for 
the claims alleged by Bodell Construction. While I have made certain assumptions about 
the facts of this case for purposes of my analysis, I do not intend to opine on the veracity 
of any specific evidence other than that with which I have personal knowledge and 
information by virtue of being a fact witness to some of the events at issue in this case. I 
may supplement, update or modify this report at a later date if additional information 
becomes available. 
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II. QUALIFICATIONS OF WITNESS 
I have a B.S. degree with a major in Accounting and a minor in Business 
Management from Brigham Young University. I am a Certified Public Accountant 
licensed to practice by the State of Utah. 
I am presently employed as the Secretary and Treasurer at Bodell Construction. I 
have held that position since September 1, 2000. In that capacity I am responsible for all 
accounting functions, financial reporting functions, and financial management for the 
Company. I have considerable experience in managing investments of the Company and 
in preparing financial analyses. Attached as Exhibit 2 is a copy of my resume. I have not 
testified as an expert at trial within the last four years. I have, however, testified in 
various depositions and in arbitrations and trials purely as a fact witness within the last 
four years. 
III. CASE BACKGROUND 
The following is a summary of certain events leading up to this litigation and is 
not meant to be testimony regarding the factual background of the case; it simply serves 
as a frame of reference for the opinions that follow this section. 
Michael Bodell met Marc Jenson ("Jenson") many years ago when the two were 
neighbors. After a period of many years without much interaction, Jenson approached 
Mr. Bodell in early summer 2000 with a business opportunity. Jenson told Mr. Bodell 
that he operated a "hard money" lending company, MSF Properties, that provided high-
return, short-term bridge loans. Jenson persuaded Mr. Bodell to cause Bodell 
Construction to lend MSF Properties one million dollars ($1,000,000.00) in June 2000 for 
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use in hard money loans to third-parties. The terms of the June 2000 loan agreement are 
the subject of a Private Placement Agreement and a Guaranty, both dated June 23, 2000. 
Benjamin Lightner, who was a Wealth Advisor in the Private Banking Group of 
Bank One (a predecessor in interest of Chase), and its authorized agent, authored a letter 
(the "Letter") dated August 22, 2000, addressed "To Whom it may concern" and 
representing that: 
MadTrax Group, LLC (the "Company") and its individual members Mark Robbings 
and Marc Jenson (the "Members") will be depositing $165,000,000 into Bank One, 
Utah NA. The funding is coming from a loan agreement between MadTrax Group, 
LLC, a Utah limited liability company and Arimex Investments, LTD., a Bahamian 
corporation. The sum of $165,000,000 will be deposited into an interest bearing 
account in the name of the Company and managed by its Members. 
Should you have any questions with respect to this matter, please contact the 
undersigned. 
Lightner drafted the Letter at Mark Robbins' ("Robbins") request. Bank One and 
Lightner acknowledge these representations were false at the time they were made. 
Bodell alleges that Lightner and Bank One made those representations knowing that they 
were false or, at a minimum, that Lightner and Bank One negligently made those 
misrepresentations. Bodell further alleges that Lightner knew or could reasonably 
foresee that potential third-party lenders, a class that included Bodell, could see and rely 
on the Letter and, as a result, provide financing to Robbins, Jenson or MadTrax Group. 
Jenson obtained a copy of the Letter from Robbins and used it to induce Bodell to make a 
four million dollar ($4,000,000.00) loan in August 2000. Bodell claims it reasonably 
relied upon the representations and assurances made in the Letter in making the loan. 
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Bodell would not have made the loan absent the Letter from Bank One and the 
representations contained therein. 
Consistent with the stated purpose of the loan, Jenson combined the four million 
dollars from Bodell Construction with another four million dollars from another source 
and loaned a total of eight million dollars ($8,000,000.00) to Robbins to retire a personal 
loan and repurchase a fifty percent interest in Robbins' bicycle business. Robbins 
thereafter defaulted on the Jenson loan, and Jenson in turn defaulted on the four million 
dollar loan from Bodell Construction. 
Jenson made several payments to Bodell Construction for the June loan, and one 
payment earmarked for the August loan. Prior to filing this lawsuit, Bodell Construction 
settled its claims against Jenson in exchange for a settlement payment. 
IV. SUMMARY OPINIONS AND GROUNDS THEREOF 
A, Damages Related To Fraud 
I am informed that the court will instruct the jury on the law governing the 
calculation of damages. I am not an attorney, nor do I intend to offer opinions at trial 
about the law applicable to the calculation of damages. 
For purposes of my calculations, I have been instructed that when a plaintiff is 
fraudulently induced to enter into a transaction, Utah courts award damages based on the 
so-called "benefit of the bargain rule." I am instructed that under the benefit of the 
bargain rule, a plaintiff is entitled to compensation for the loss of his bargain and is not 
limited to his out-of-pocket damages. I have also been instructed that, in at least one 
case, a Utah appellate court affirmed an award of damages based on an alternative theory. 
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Under this alternative theory, the plaintiff was awarded damages based on the rate of 
return the plaintiff would have received if he had invested his money elsewhere. I will 
henceforth refer to this theory as the comparable rate of return rule. 
I have been further instructed that under either the benefit of the bargain rule or 
the comparable rate of return rule, a plaintiff is also entitled to compensation for any 
additional pecuniary loss that was a consequence of the fraud (i.e., consequential 
damages). 
1. Benefit Of The Bargain Rule 
As a result of the fraudulent misrepresentations in the Letter, Bodell Construction 
made a four million dollar ($4,000,000.00) loan to Jenson. Bodell Construction, in 
return, was promised that it would receive interest on the loan at the rate of one percent 
(1.0 %) per week, accruing on the outstanding balance weekly, in advance, at the 
beginning of each Wednesday, until it was repaid. The specific repayment terms of the 
loan are set forth in a Promissory Note signed by Jenson on August 30, 2000. I 
understand that courts that have applied the benefit of the bargain rule in similar 
situations have awarded damages based on the contractual rate of interest. 
Bodell Construction made the loan on August 30, 2000, Applying interest at the 
contractual rate described in the Promissory Note, and accounting for the contractual loan 
fees and default fees, and after making adjustments for monies received in from Jenson, 
the outstanding amount of principal and interest due and owing on the loan as of October 
22, 2007 (the first day of trial) is $18,449,872.41. The Promissory Note also provides 
and Bodell bargained for "all reasonable costs of collection or other costs incurred in the 
- 6 -
protection of [Bodell Construction], including, but not limited to, reasonable attorneys 
fees and costs incurred by [Bodell Construction] if [the] Promissory Note is referred to an 
attorney for collection." Through April 30, 2007, Bodell has incurred $393,417.98 in 
attorneys' fees and costs attempting to recover for breach of the Promissory Note. That is 
part of the agreement Bodell Construction bargained for. Adding that sum to the total for 
principle and interest, Bodell Construction is entitled to $18,843,290.39 (plus attorneys' 
fees and costs through triall) if the jury concludes it should receive the benefit of the 
bargain it made in reliance on the fraudulent misrepresentations made by Bank One in its 
Letter. Attached as Exhibit 4 is a spreadsheet detailing the specific calculations used to 
reach this figure. 
I am informed that consequential damages are also recoverable in fraud cases. I 
am instructed that consequential damages include (but are not necessarily limited to) the 
following: expenses resulting from the misrepresentations; loss of goodwill; any amounts 
expended in mitigation of damages; lost earnings; pre-judgment interest; and interest on 
loans required to finance plaintiffs business due to the unpaid loan. For purposes of my 
analysis, I have conservatively identified as consequential damages only the amount of 
interest Bodell Construction was required to pay on money it was forced to borrow 
against its line of credit as a result of not receiving the payments promised in connection 
with the August 2000 Jenson loan. Attached as Exhibit 9 is a spreadsheet detailing my 
calculations of those actual consequential damages incurred by Bodell as a result of the 
$4,000,000 loan it was induced to make. As shown in Exhibit 9, those damages total 
$127,281.18. 
- 7 -
Adding Bodell Construction's consequential damages to the other totals results in 
total damages of $18,970,571.57 under the benefit of the bargain rule. 
Acknowledging that Bodell Construction entered into the August 2000 Jenson 
loan with an expectation that the loan was to be relatively short-term in nature, I have 
been asked to perform a modified benefit of the bargain rule analysis as an aid to the jury. 
For purposes of this analysis, I applied the terms and conditions of the August 2000 loan 
agreement only through October 3, 2000, the date specified in the contract for payment of 
all outstanding principal and interest (and fees, etc.). From that date forward, I 
substituted the statutory rate of interest (10%) for the contractual rate of interest (one 
percent per week). For purposes of this analysis, I also excluded the default and late fees 
for which the contract provides. All other aspects of my previous calculation remained in 
effect (attorneys' fees and costs per the contract, and interest payments as consequential 
damages). Applying the statutory rate of return, instead of the contract rate, from the date 
on which all the principal and interest was due and owing, results in total damages to 
Bodell Construction of $5,890,768.12 under the modified benefit of the bargain rule. 
Attached as Exhibit 6 is a spreadsheet detailing the specific calculations used to reach this 
result. 
2. Comparable Rate of Return 
MJB Ltd., a Bodell Family Partnership and James H. Bodell, a Bodell 
Construction Stockholder have made loans to other bridge loan companies over the years 
that have had rates of return ranging between 18 and 36 percent, with 25 percent 
representing a fair estimate of the average rate of return for this kind of transaction. This 
- 8 -
figure is confirmed by loan documents generated in connection with those loans. Bodell 
Construction very likely could have achieved returns above 18 percent had it invested 
elsewhere the four million dollars it was instead induced to loan to Jenson. Nonetheless, 
for purposes of my comparable rate of return analysis here I have assumed a rate of 18 
percent as a comparable rate of return available through other investments. Applying that 
rate from the date of the Jenson loan, it is my opinion that Bodell Construction would 
have earned $3,510,352.96, in addition to the payments applied to the note, had Bodell 
Construction invested in its traditional method the four million dollars it was instead 
fraudulently induced to loan to Jenson. Thus, Bodell Construction's damages under the 
comparable rate of return rule is $7,510,352.96 including the $4,000,000.00 of the 
original loan. Attached as Exhibit 5 is a spreadsheet detailing my calculations of those 
damages. 
Because this calculation is not directly based on the contractual terms of the 
Jenson loan, I have not included in this analysis attorneys' fees, costs or consequential 
damages, such as interest paid on lines of credit Bodell Construction was forced to tap 
when Jenson failed to make payments on the August 2000 loan. 
3. Total Fraud Damages 
Based on the calculations described above, it is my opinion that the fraudulent 
misrepresentations made in the August 22, 2000 letter caused Bodell Construction to 
incur damages totaling $18,970,571.57 under the benefit of the bargain rule; 
$5,890,768.12 under the modified benefit of the bargain rule; or totaling $7,510,352.96 
under the comparable rate of return rule. These amounts do not include any allocation for 
- 9 -
punitive damages, which I am told are subject to a separate analysis for the jury to 
conduct after instruction by the court. 
B. Damages Related to Negligent Misrepresentations 
I have been instructed that the proper measure of damages in an action for 
negligent misrepresentation is that amount necessary to compensate the plaintiff for the 
pecuniary loss to him for which the misrepresentation is the legal cause, and often is 
measured as the difference between the value received in a transaction and any value 
given for it, plus any additional pecuniary losses otherwise suffered as a consequence of 
the misrepresentation (i.e., consequential damages). I am informed that under Utah law 
the total measure of such damages includes statutory prejudgment interest at a rate of 
10% per annum as the damages become liquidated. 
1. Difference Between Value Received and Value Given 
In this case, the difference between the value that Bodell Construction received in 
connection with the August 2000 loan and the value given was $4,000,000, minus funds 
received from Jenson and applied against the August 2000 loan. Exhibit 10 shows the 
$4,000,000 loan accruing interest at the statutory rate (10%) from the date of the loan 
through the first day of trial, making adjustments for payments received by Jenson 
against the August 2000 loan. Statutory interest is applied here because the damages 
were liquidated when Bodell Construction made the loan in August 2000. After 
accounting for the Jenson payments, the difference between the value given and the value 
received is $4,939,195.32. 
- 1 0 -
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As I did previously in the benefit of the bargain analysis, I conservatively apply as 
consequential damages here only interest payments Bodell Construction was forced to 
make when it had to draw on its line of credit as a result of Jenson missing payments 
under the August 2000 loan. As shown in Exhibit 9, those payments totaled $127,281.18. 
2. Total Negligent Misrepresentation Damages. 
Adding consequential damages to the analysis above for the difference between 
the value given and the received in connection with the August 2000 loan, Bodell 
Construction's damages under a negligent misrepresentation analysis conservatively total 
$5,066,476.50. This does not include application of prejudgment interest to the 
consequential damages as they became liquidated. 
V. COMPENSATION AND PUBLICATIONS 
Save for my regular salary, I am receiving no compensation for my work on this 
report. There have been no publications authored by me within the preceding ten years. 
As this case progresses, I reserve the right to supplement this report as needed or 
as additional relevant information becomes available. 
Sincerely, 
lerrill Weight 
- 1 1 -
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EXHIBIT 1 
Bodell Constriction Company 
v. 
JPMorgan Chase Bank 
DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION REVIEWED BY MERRILL L. WEIGHT FOR 
PREPARATION OF EXPERT WITNESS REPORT 
MSF Properties, L.C. Certificate of Participation, dated June 23, 2000. 
MSF Properties Private Placement Agreement, dated June 23, 2000. 
Guaranty, dated June 23, 2000. 
Promissory Note, Dated August 30, 2000. 
Guaranty, dated August 30, 2000. 
Payment documentation for payments on the Certificate of Completion and Promissory 
Note. 
Legal fees and cost billings for collection actions on the Certificate of Completion and 
Promissory Note. 
Bank and accounting information for interest paid on the Bodell line of credit. 
Letter, dated August 22, 2000 from Benjamin Lightner. 
Bridge Loan terms from Waterford Funding, LLC, and Cypress Capital. 
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EXHIBIT 2 
As Secretary and Treasurer of Bodell Construction Company, Mr. 
Weight is responsible for all financial operations within the Company. 
This includes the preparation of financial statements, management 
reports, corporate and field office administration, tax management, and 
resolution of perception differences. 
Bodell Construction Company maintains it's financial stability and 
viability, due to Mr. Weight's years of experience and accounting 
responsibilities. 
Summary of Experience 
Prior to joining Bodell Construction, Mr. Weight worked for the following 
organizations: 
Project Analysts, Executive Vice President 
Mr. Weight was responsible for office administration, sales, preparation 
of construction claims and expert witness testimony. 
Jelco, Inc., Secretary /Treasurer 
Responsible for accounting operations, including financial and job cost 
management, income taxes, and corporate/field office administration. 
Cooper & Lybrand, Senior Staff Auditor 
Mr. Weight performed certified audits of client financial statements and 
prepared income tax returns, with construction clients as a specialty. 
Merrill L Weight 














costing and reporting 
Income Tax Planning 
Extensive knowledge 
of the construction 
industry 
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BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
MSF PROPERTIES, L.C. 
$4,000,000 NOTE 
COMPARISON TOTALS 




! Exhibit 4 Exhibit 5 * Exhibit 6" ~ I 
Alternative I 
Ujiing Original | 
Note Terms 
Excluding 
' ~ ' ' Default Penalty 1 
Through 10-3-00 
Per Original 'ubsequent at | 
| Note Terms 10% APR I 
Principal Balance 
Accrued Interest Balance 
Subtotal For Principal And interest 
Legal Fees And Costs 1hrough 4-30-07 (Exhibit 7) 
Subtotal Including Principal, Interest, and Legal Fees And Costs 
Consequential Damages - Interest on Bank Line of Credit Borrowing 
Total Including Principal, interest. Legal Fees and Costs, and Consequential Damages 
$4,280,000.00 $4,000,000.00 $3,694,000,12 










$18,970,571.57 $7,510,352.96 $5,890,768.12 
BODELL, CON'S TRUCT ION 
HSF PROPERTIES, L . C . 
5 4 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 NOTE 
AMORTIZATION SCHETUI-2 





NUMBER PRINCIPAL 1 TOTAL 
OF WEEKS INCREASE 1 PAYMENT 
INTEREST j INTEREST 
ACCRUED J PAID OR ADJ 
INTEREST j VKLSZZ--Z. 




INTEREST ADDED TO PRINC 
LOAN FEE 
LATE CHARGE ON DEFAULT 
INTEREST ACCRUAL THROUGH 
PAYMENT (NOTE 1) 
INTEREST ACCRUAL THROUGH 
PAYMENT 


























































TOTAL BALANCE DUE THROUGH 10/23/2007 
PRINCIPAL 
INTEREST 
TOTAL PRINCIPAL AND INTEREST 
LEGAL FEES, COLLECTION COSTS THROUGH 4/30/07 
COMBINED 
$4 ,280 ,000 .00 
14 /169 ,872 .41 
18 ,449 ,872 .41 
393,417.98 
$18,843,290.39 
INTEREST ACCRUAL PER WEEK. SUBSEQUENT TO 1 0 / 2 3 / 2 0 07 
PRINCIPAL BALANCE 
TIMES WEEKLY RATE 
WEEKLY INTEREST CHARGES IN ADVANCE EACH WEDNESDAY 
$ 4 , 2 8 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
1.00% 
$ 4 2 , 8 0 0 . 0 0 
(NOTE 1} PAYMENT APPLIED FIRST TO LATE FEE AS REDUCTION OF PRXNCIPAL, AND REMAINDER TO INTEREST 
BODELL CONSTRUCTION 
MSF P R O P E R T I E S , L - C . 






INTEREST ACCRUAL THROUGH 
PAYMENT 
INTEREST ACCRUAL THROUGH 
PAYMENT 


















$ 4 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 - 0 0 
$ 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
1 , 3 8 6 , 1 6 7 . 5 9 
TOTAJQ BALANCE DUB THROUGH 1 0 / 2 2 / 2 0 07 
PRIKCIPAL 
INTEREST 
TOTAL PRINCIPAL AND INTEREST 
$ 4 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
3 , 5 1 0 , 3 5 2 . 9 6 
7 , 5 1 0 , 3 5 2 - 9 6 
INTEREST ACCRUAL PER DAY SUBSEQUENT TO 
PRINCIPAL BALANCE 
TIKES DAILY RATE 
DAILY INTEREST CHARGES 
1 0 / 2 2 / 2 0 0 7 
$ 4 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
0 - 0 4 9 3 % 
$ 1 , 9 7 2 . 0 0 
_o 
EXHIBIT 5 





































MSF P R O P E R T I E S , L . C . 
3 4 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 NOTE 
AMORTIZATION SCHEDULE 
I N T E R E S T RATE 
ALTERNATIVE PRE- .JUDGMENT RATE AFTER ORIGINAL DUE DATE 
1.00% PER WEEK IN ADVANCE EACH WEDNESDAY THROUGH 1 0 - 3 - 0 0 
1 0 . 0 0 % APR SUBSEQUENT TO 1 0 - 3 - 0 0 CALCULATED ON DAYS OUTSTANDING 
3 6 5 DAY YEAR 
PRINT DATE 
















ORIGINAL LOAN 8/30/2000 
INTEREST ADDED TO PRINC 10/3/2000 
LOAN FEE 10/3/2000 
LATE CHARGE ON DEFAULT {1 10/3/2000 
INTEREST ACCRUAL THROUGH S/2/2001 
PAYMENT 5/2/20 01 
INTEREST ACCRUAL THROUGH 3/18/2 003 
PAYMENT 3/18/2003 
































































































































TOTAL BALANCE DUE THROUGH 10/22/2007 
PRINCIPAL 
INTEREST 
TOTAL PRIMCIPAL AND INTER3ST 







INTEREST ACCRUAL PER DAY 
PRINCIPAL BALANCE 
TIMES DAILY RATE 
DAILY INTEREST CHARGES 
SUBSEQUENT TO 10/22/2 007 
NOTE (1) LATE CHARGE ON DEFAULT NOT ASSESSED IN TEIS CALCULATION 
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BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
MSF PROPERTIES / MARC JENSON NOTES RECEIVABLE 
LEGAL FEES FOR COLLECTION ACTIONS THROUGH 4-30-07 
AND APPLICATION OF 3/18/03 PAYMENT 
EXHIBIT 7 
6/11/07 
LAW FIRM INVOICE DATE INVOICE AMOUNT SUBTOTAL 
ALLOCATEO TO 
6-23-00 NOTE 20% 
ALLOCATED TO 
8-30-00 NOTE 
NELSON RASMUSSEN & 
NELSON RASMUSSEN & 
NELSON RASMUSSEN & 
NELSON RASMUSSEN & 
NELSON RASMUSSEN & 
NELSON RASMUSSEN & 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
























6,054.09 £4,543.74 816,174.97 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 







BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE $ MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIOGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIOGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
BURBIDGE MITCHELL & GROSS 
BURBIDGE MITCHELL & GROSS 
BURBIDGE MnXHELL & GROSS 



























































































TOTAL LEGAL FEES FOR COLLECTION THROUGH 4/30/07 
ALLOCATION PERCENTAGE FOR FEES THROUGH 3^31-03 
NOTE DATED 6/23/2000 ORIGINAL PRINCIPAL AMOUNT 
NOTE DATED 8/30/2000 ORIGINAL PRINCIPAL AMOUNT 







APPLICATION OF 3/10/03 PAYMENT 
6/23/2000 NOTE PRINCIPAL (TO EXHIBIT 8) $1,128,541.94 
6/23/2000 NOTE INTEREST (TO EXHIBIT 8) 480,746.73 
6/23/2000 NOTE LEGAL FEES AND COLLECTION COSTS (ABOVE) 4,543.74 
8/30/00 NOTE INTEREST (TO EXHIBIT 4) 1,386,167.59 
TOTAL. 3/18/03 PAYMENT $3,000,000.00 
BODELL. CONSTRUCTION 




ORIGINAL PER NOTE TERMS 
25.00% APR 
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CALCULATION OF CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES 
LINE OF CREDIT STATEMENT - INTEREST COSTS 
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LINE OF CREDIT STATEMENT - INTEREST COSTS 
6-23-00 TO 12-31-06 
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LINE OF CREDIT STATEMENT - INTEREST COSTS 
6-23-00 TO 12-31-06 
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LINE OF CREDIT STATEMENT - INTEREST COSTS 
6-23-00 TO 12-31-06 

















































































































































































































































































I 1,471,907.34 j 337.32 j J^25% ; 
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LINE OF CREDIT STATEMENT - INTEREST COSTS 
6-23-00 TO 12-31-06 
FROM TO TRANS TYPE ADVANCE PAYMENT PRINCBAL INT ACCRUE RATE INT. PAID 

















































































































































































































































TOTAL INTEREST COSTS $127,281.18 $127,281.18 
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$ 4 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 NOTE 
AMORTIZATION SCHEDULE 
INTEREST RATE 
STATUTORY PREJUDGEMENT RATE 
1 0 . 0 0 % APR 
365 DAY YEAR 
PRINT DATE 
EXHIBIT 10 



















INTEREST ACCRUAL THROUGH 
PAYMENT 
INTEREST ACCRUAL THROUGH 
PAYMENT 












$ 4 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
$ 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 





























TOTAL BALANCE DUE THROUGH 1 0 / 2 2 / 2 0 07 
PRINCIPAL 
INTEREST 




INTEREST ACCRUAL PER DAY SUBSEQUENT TO 
PRINCIPAL BALANCE 
TIMES DAILY RATE 






Gregory G. Skordas (#3865) 
Rebecca C. Hyde (#6409) 
SKORDAS CASTON & HYDE 
341 S. Main Street, Suite 303 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Tel. (801)531-7444 
Fax (801)531-8885 
Attorneys for Defendant 
^ o ' S T H i c r COURT 
WAV 2 9 2008 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARC S. JENSON, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT IN 
ADVANCE OF NO CONTEST PLEA, 
NO CONTEST PLEA, AND 
PLEA IN ABEYANCE 
Case No. 051905391 
Judge Robin Reese 
The Defendant, Marc S. Jenson, by and through his attorney, Gregory G. Skordas, and 
pursuant to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Title 77, Chapter 13, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended, and hereby acknowledges and certifies the following: 
I have entered a plea of no contest to the following crimes: 
CRIME AND 




Sale of an unregistered Third Degree Felony 0-5 years Utah State Prison; 
security (U.C.A. §§ 61-1-7 $5,000 fine, plus 85% surcharge 
and 61-1-21) (Bodell) 
Sale of an unregistered Third Degree Felony 0-5 years Utah State Prison; 
security (U.C.A. §§ 61-1-7 $5,000 fine, plus 85% surcharge 
and 61-1-21) (Ebeling) 
Sale of an unregistered Third Degree Felony 0-5 years Utah State Prison; 
security (U.C.A. §§ 61-1-7 $5,000 fine, plus 85% surcharge 
and 61-1-21) (Ebeling) 
I understand the nature and elements of the offenses for which I am pleading no contest, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I am entering this plea voluntarily and with knowledge and understanding of the following 
facts: 
1. Defendant Marc S. Jenson, age 48, is a resident of Salt Lake City, Utah. During the 
relevant time period, Mr. Jenson was the registered agent and sole manager of MSF Properties, L.C. 
("MSF Properties") and Wilshire Investments, LLC ("Wilshire Investments"). Mr. Jenson5 s primary 
business was in a type of commercial lending sometimes known as "hard-money lending", which 
involves making short-term, high-interest loans to real estate developers and entrepreneurs seeking to 
take advantage of time-critical opportunities or working to secure long-term financing. 
2. In August 2005, Mr. Jenson was charged by the State of Utah in an Information (the 
"Original Information") with five counts of securities fraud and one count of racketeering: 
• Count 1 involved an investment in June 2000 by Michael Bodell ("Bodell") 
and his company Bodell Construction with MSF Properties. 
• Count 2 involved a loan in August 2000 by Bodell and Bodell Construction 
to MSF Properties. 
2 
• Count 3 and Count 4 related to funds in the amount of $2,500,000, delivered 
to MSF Properties by Morris K. Ebeling ("Ebeling") in September 2000. 
• Count 5 involved investments during the summer of 2001 by Ricke White 
("White") and his company RA Enterprises, LLC, with MSF Properties 
and/or Wilshire Investments. 
• Count 6 alleged a violation of Utah's racketeering statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§76-10-1601*/^. 
3. Also in August 2005, the Utah Division of S ecurities issued an Order to Show Cause 
(the "Division Action") against Mr. Jenson and MSF Properties relating to the same transactions 
referenced in the Original Information and alleging (a) securities fraud, (b) sale by an unlicensed 
broker-dealer or agent, and (c) sale of unregistered securities. 
4. Mr. Jenson entered a plea of not guilty to all of the Counts set forth in the Original 
Information. Pending resolution of this case, Mr. Jenson has not responded to the Division Action. 
Bodell Counts 
5. Following a hearing on the matter in August 2007, Count 1 was not bound over as it 
fell outside the statute of limitations. Mr. Jenson was bound over on Count 2, Count 3, Count 4, 
Count 5 and Count 6 of the Original Information. 
6. In the transaction forming the basis for Count 2 of the Original Information, Bodell 
loaned $4,000,000 to MSF Properties and Mr. Jenson personally guaranteed the loan. MSF 
Properties and Mr. Jenson were unable to repay the loan on time and Bodell later threatened civil 
litigation against Mr. Jenson and MSF Properties. 
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7. On March 18,2003, Mr. Jenson, MSF Properties and Bodell entered into a settlement 
agreement pursuant to which Mr. Jenson and MSF Properties made a $3 million payment to Bodell 
and Bodell signed an accord and satisfaction in which he waived all of his claims against Mr. Jenson 
and MSF Properties relating to the transactions among them. 
8. In May 2008, Mr. Jenson, MSF Properties and Bodell entered into an agreement (the 
"Bodell Restitution Agreement") pursuant to which Mr. Jenson and MSF Properties have agreed to 
provide additional consideration to Bodell which Bodell has confiimed will be satisfactory to him as 
foil restitution from Mr. Jenson in connection with the loans made by Bodell to MSF Properties and 
Mr. Jenson. Bodell has also confirmed that he fully supports the plea arrangement provided for 
herein. 
Ebeling Counts 
9. In August and September 2000, MSF Properties used the $4,000,000 it received from 
Bodell, together with $4,000,000 in additional funds, which included the $2,500,000 from Ebeling, 
to make an $8,000,000 loan to Mark Robbins ("Robbins"). 
10. Ebeling did not receive any of his funds back from Jenson. In 2003, Ebeling sued Mr. 
Jenson, MSF Properties, Robbins and others in connection with his funds, pursuant to a case in Third 
District Court, State of Utah, captioned Ebeling v. Jenson et ah. Civil No. 030915550 (the "Ebeling 
Litigation"). Mr. Jenson and MSF Properties have counterclaimed against Ebeling in the Ebeling 
Litigation and have also sued Robbins separately to collect on the loan (and other subsequent loans) 
made by MSF Properties to Robbins. 
11. In May 2008, Mr. Jenson, MSF Properties and Ebeling entered into an agreement (the 
"Ebeling Restitution Agreement") pursuant to which Mr. Jenson and MSF Properties have agreed to 
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provide consideration to Ebeling which Ebeling has confirmed will (a) be satisfactory to him as full 
restitution from Mr. Jenson in connection with the funds provided by Ebeling to MSF Properties and 
Mr. Jenson and (b) definitively resolve all outstanding matters in the Ebeling Litigation as between 
Ebeling, on the one hand, and MSF Properties and Mr. Jenson, on the other hand. Ebeling has also 
confirmed that he fully supports the plea arrangement provided for herein. 
White Count 
12. In the transaction forming the basis for Count 5 of the Original Information, White 
invested $5,000,000 with Wilshire Investments in the summer of 2001. Pursuant to a lawsuit and a 
series of settlement agreements entered into between Jenson and White from 2003 to 2005, (a) 
Jensonpaid White $6,125,000 in cash and real estate, receipt of which White acknowledged in such 
agreements and in sworn testimony at Defendant's preliminary hearing in this matter, and (b) White 
released all of his claims against Mr. Jenson. Accordingly, White was made whole and Mr. Jenson 
owes no restitution to White. 
Amended Information 
13. In connection with the plea bargain arrangement provided for below, the State of Utah 
has filed an Amended Information relating to the charges to which Mr. Jenson is pleading no contest 
hereunder (the "Amended Information"). 
DECLARATIONS 
In connection with and for purposes of my no contest plea as described above: 
A. I do not contest the allegation that the investments made by Bodell, Ebeling and 
White constituted "securities" under the Utah Uniform Securities Act; 
5 
B. I acknowledge and admit that such securities were not registered for sale in the State 
ofUtah. 
C. I do not contest the allegations that (1) such securities do not constitute "federal 
covered securities" under the Utah Uniform Securities Act, or (2) such securities and/or my offer and 
sale thereof did not qualify for any exemption from registration under the Utah Uniform Securities 
Act. 
D. I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot afford 
one, an attorney will be appointed by the Court at no cost to me. I recognize that a condition of a 
sentence imposed in this case maybe to require me to pay an amount, as determined by the Court, to 
recoup the cost of counsel if so appointed for me. 
E. I have not waived my right to counsel. 
F. My attorney is Gregory G. Skordas, and I have had an opportunity to discuss this 
statement, my rights and the consequences of my no contest plea with my attorney. 
G. I know that I have a right to a trial in open court by an impartial jury, and that I am 
giving up that right by pleading no contest. 
H. I know that if I wish to have a trial, I have the right to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses against me or to have them cross-examined by my attorney. I also know that I have the 
right to compel my witnesses by subpoena at State expense to testify in court on my behalf. 
I. I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf but if I choose not to do so, I 
cannot be compelled to testify or give evidence against myself and no adverse inferences will be 
drawn against me if I do not testify. 
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J. I understand the fact that as a defendant, I enjoy the right of a presumption of 
innocence. I understand that I am presumed innocent until the State proves my guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt if this case is tried to a judge or jury, or until I plead guilty or no contest. I 
understand that I give up the right to the presumption of innocence if I plead no contest. 
K. I know that if I wish to contest the charges against me, my plea of not guilty 
previously entered would require that the matter be set for trial. At the trial the State of Utah will 
have the burden of proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is 
before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous. 
L. I know that, under the Constitution of Utah, if I were tried and convicted by a jury, or 
by the judge, that I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, those costs would be paid by 
the State. 
M. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for the offenses to which I plead 
no contest, which is a fine of $5,000, 0-5 years in prison, or both, for each separate count in the 
Amended Information. I know that the sentence may be for a jail or prison term, fine, or both. I 
know that in addition to any fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge thereon, required by Utah 
Code Annotated §63-63a-4, will be imposed. 
N. I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods, or the fine for additional 
amounts, if my plea is to more than one charge. I also know that, if I am on probation, parole, or 
awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been convicted, or to which I have plead no 
contest, my plea in the present action may result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me. 
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0. I know and understand that by pleading no contest, I am waiving my statutory and 
constitutional rights set out in the preceding paragraphs D through N. 
P. My plea of no contest is the result of a plea bargain agreement between the 
prosecuting attorney and me, the terms and conditions of which are set forth below under "Plea 
Agreement". I understand that my plea will be held in abeyance up to Thirty-Six (36) months for 
dismissal, such abeyance period commencing on May 29, 2008. 
PLEA AGREEMENT 
The terms and conditions of the plea bargain agreement are as follows: 
1. Defendant Marc S. Jenson and MSF Properties and the Utah Division of Securities 
shall herewith enter into a Stipulation and Consent Order (the "Division Consent Order") in the form 
of Exhibit A hereto, providing for the resolution of the Division Action. 
2. Defendant shall comply, and shall cause MSF Properties to comply, with the terms 
and conditions of the Division Consent Order, including the payment by Jenson or MSF to the Utah 
Division of Securities, within thirty (30) days hereof, of a fine in the amount of $15,000. 
3. Within the abeyance period, Mr. Jenson shall pay restitution to Bodell in the amount 
of $1,600,000 or an amount agreed upon by Mr. Jenson and Bodell in his discretion. Written 
confirmation by Bodell to the Utah Attorney General that he has received such consideration from 
Mr. Jenson shall be sufficient to evidence Mr. Jenson's satisfaction of this condition. 
4. Within the abeyance period, Mr. Jenson shall pay restitution to^belingin|he sunount 
of $2,500,000 or an amount agreed upon by Mr. Jenson and Ebeling in his discretion. Written 
confirmation by Ebeling to the Utah Attorney General that he has received such consideration from 
Mr. Jenson shall be sufficient to evidence Mr. Jenson's satisfaction of this condition. 
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5. During the abeyance period, Mr. Jenson shall refrain from making any new "hard 
money" loans as lender, whether directly or indirectly through entities owned or controlled by him. 
Notwithstanding the above, Mr. Jenson shall not be prohibited from participating in the ownership, 
financing and/or management of the Mount Holly Club resort development in Beaver County and 
conducting or directing the business activities of such enterprise including borrowing in connection 
with the Mount Holly Club project. 
6. During the abeyance period, Mr. Jenson shall not be convicted of any violation of 
Utah state or federal law, excepting infractions and traffic citations. 
7. Mr. Jenson shall, not later than July 31 of each calendar year during the abeyance 
period, provide the Attorney General's office with copies of his personal federal income tax return 
filed for the calendar year ending on the previous December 31; provided that, in the event Mr. 
Jenson files one or more timely requests for extension of the applicable filing date for such return, 
then he shall provide the Attorney General's office with a copy of such requests not later than such 
July 31 and then provide the Attorney General's office with the copies of the relevant tax return not 
later than 30 days following his actual filing of suchretura. The Attorney General's office will treat 
all such tax returns as confidential. 
8. Upon the entry of Defendant's no contest plea to the offenses listed above, the Court 
shall dismiss with prejudice all remaining pending charges against Defendant. 
9. Upon the fulfillment of the conditions, following motion by Defendant and 
opportunity for hearing, the Court, upon finding that all such conditions have been fulfilled, shall (a) 
set aside the no contest plea and (b) dismiss with prejudice all charges against the Defendant for the 
offenses listed above. 
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10. At any time following eighteen months from the commencement of this agreement 
and following (a) payment of the administrative fine as required by Paragraph 2 above, (b) 
satisfaction by Mr. Jenson of the requirements of Paragraph 3 above, and (c) satisfaction by Mr. 
Jenson of the requirements of Paragraph 4 above, then (1) Mr. Jenson may file a motion to terminate 
the abeyance early so long as Mr. Jenson has also complied (for the portion of the abeyance period 
prior to such motion) with the other conditions set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 7 above, and (2) the 
State will not oppose such motion for early termination so long Mr. Jenson has fully complied with 
all of such conditions. 
ADDITIONAL DECLARATIONS 
A. I know and understand that if I desire to withdraw my plea of no contest, I must do so 
by filing a motion within thirty (30) days after entry of my sentencing. 
B. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind have been made to induce me 
to plead no contest, and no promises except those contained herein have been made to me. 
C. I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand 
its provisions. I know that I am free to change or delete anything contained in this statement. I do 
not wish to make any changes because all of the statements are correct. 
D. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
E. I am 48 years of age; I have attended school through one year of college, and I can 
read and understand the English language. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication or 
intoxicants which would impair my judgment when the decision was made to enter the plea. I am 
not presently under the influence of any drug, medication or intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
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G. I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind, mentally capable of 
understanding the proceedings and the consequences of my plea and free of any mental disease, 
defect or impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entering 
my plea. 
[Remainder of Page Intentionally Blank - Signature Page Follows] 
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My commission expires 
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CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against Marc S. Jenson, 
Defendant. I have reviewed this statement of Defendant and find that the declaration, including the 
Statement of Facts relating to Defendant's conduct in relation to the listed offenses, is true and 
correct. No improper inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a plea have been offered 
Defendant. The plea negotiations are fiilly contained in the statement or as supplemented on record 
before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the 
conviction of Defendant for the offenses for which the plea is entered, and acceptance of the plea 
would serve the public interest 
lis ^T DATED this * w day of May, 2008. 
Prosecutor 
* * * • & * * * * 
CCXA^eA < % T C>JlA^UN£.Voors.V-
ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement and the certification of the 
Defendant and counsel, the Court witnesses the signatures and finds Defendant's plea of no contest is 
freely and voluntarily made, and it is so ordered that (1) Defendant's plea of no contest to the charges 
set forth in the statement and the Amended Information be accepted and entered, and (2) each of the 
charges set forth in the Original Information be dismissed with prejudice. 
DONE IN COURT this %ei day of May, 2008. 
BY THE COURT: 
yU 
District Court Judge Rxdpfr , 
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Exhibit A 
Form of Division Consent Order 
[Attached] 
Mark L.Shurtleff (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
( ) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
Commercial Enforcement Division 
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor 
P. O. Box 140872 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0872 
Telephone: (801) 366-0310 
FAX: (801)366-0315 
Attorneys for Utah Division of Securities 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF SECURITIES 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF: : 
MARC SESSIONS JENSON and ; 
MSF PROPERTIES, L.C., ; 
Respondents. ] 
) STIPULATION AND CONSENT 
) ORDER 
) Docket No. SD-05-0039 
) Docket No. SD-05-0040 
The Utah Division of Securities ("Division"), by and through its Director (actual or acting), 
and Respondents MSF Properties, L.C., a Utah limited liability company ("MSF Properties" or "the 
company"), and its manager Marc Sessions Jenson ("Jenson"), hereby stipulate and agree as follows: 
1. In August 2005, the Division issued an Order to Show Cause against MSF Properties and 
Jenson alleging that they may have violated Section 61-1-1 (securities fraud), Section 61-1-3 
(sale by an unlicensed broker-dealer or agent) and/or Section 61-1-7 (sale of unregistered 
securities) of the Utah Uniform Securities Act (the "Act"), Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1 etseq. 
2. Mr. Jenson and MSF Properties have agreed to resolve this matter and the allegations made 
in the Order to Show Cause by way of this Stipulation and Consent Order (this "Stipulation") 
without further adjudicative proceedings. 
3. Mr. Jenson and MSF Properties admit the jurisdiction of the Division over them and the 
subject matter of this action. 
4. By entering into this Stipulation, Mr. Jenson and MSF Properties waive any right in this 
matter to (a) challenge the Division's investigation, (b) present evidence on their behalf at a 
hearing, or (c) seek agency review or an appeal of this matter, administrative or judicial. 
5. Mr. Jenson and MSF Properties have read this Stipulation, understand its contents, and enter 
into this Stipulation voluntarily. No promises or threats have been made by the Division, nor 
by any representative of the Division, to induce Mr. Jenson or MSF Properties to enter into 
this Stipulation, other than as described herein. 
I. FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Parties and Entities 
6. Marc Sessions Jenson ("Jenson"), age 48, is (and was at all relevant times) (a) a Utah 
resident with an address of 2046 E. Normandywoods Court, Holladay, Utah 84117, and (b) 
the sole manager and registered agent of MSF Properties, L.C. ("MSF Properties"), and 
Wilshire Investments, LLC ("Wilshire"). 
7. MSF Properties was registered with the Utah Division of Corporations and Commercial 
Code as a domestic limited liability company on July 21,1999. The current status of MSF is 
listed as "active" and its business address is 2340 E. Phylden Dr., Holladay, Utah 84117. 
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8. Wilshire was registered with the Utah Division of Corporations and Commercial Code as a 
domestic limited liability company on July 23,2001. The current status of Wilshire is listed 
as "active" and its business address is 2340 E. Phylden Dr., Holladay, Utah 84117. 
9. MSF Properties and Wilshire, from inception until approximately 2003, were in the business 
of making commercial loans sometimes known as "hard-money lending", which involves 
making short-term, high-interest loans to real estate developers and entrepreneurs seeking to 
take advantage of time-critical opportunities or working to secure long-term financing. 
The Division's Investigation 
(Michael J. Bodell) 
10. In June 2000, Michael J. Bodell and Bodell Construction (collectively, "Bodell"), invested 
$1,000,000 with MSF Properties pursuant to a "Certificate of Participation" and a "Private 
Placement Agreement", in connection with which Mr. Jenson gave Bodell a personal 
guaranty ("Bodell Investment #1"). 
11. On August 30,2000, Bodell loaned an additional $4,000,000 to MSF Properties pursuant to a 
promissory note executed by Mr. Jenson on behalf of MSF Properties, and Mr. Jenson 
personally guaranteed the loan ("Bodell Investment #2"). 
12. On March 18, 2003, Mr. Jenson, MSF Properties and Bodell entered into a settlement 
agreement resolving their dispute pursuant to which Mr. Jenson and MSF Properties made a 
significant payment to Bodell and Bodell waived all of his claims against Mr. Jenson and 
MSF Properties relating to the transactions among them. 
13. In May 2008, Mr. Jenson, MSF Properties and Bodell entered into an agreement (the "Bodell 
Restitution Agreement") pursuant to which Mr. Jenson and MSF Properties have agreed to 
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provide additional consideration to Bodell which Bodell has confirmed will be satisfactory to 
him as full restitution from Mr. Jenson and MSF Properties in connection with Bodell 
Investment #1 and Bodell Investment #2. Bodell has also confirmed that he fully supports 
the resolution of this matter as set forth in this Stipulation and Consent Order. 
(Morris K. Ebeling) 
14. In September 2000, MSF Properties received from Spencer Brannan certain funds (the 
"Ebeling Funds") in the amount of $2,500,000 provided by Morris K. Ebeling ("Ebeling"). 
15. Ebeling did not receive any of his funds back from Jenson. In 2003, Ebeling sued Mr. 
Jenson, MSF Properties, Robbins and others in connection with his funds, pursuant to a case 
in Third District Court, State of Utah, captioned Ebeling v. Jenson et ai, Civil No. 
030915550 (the "Ebeling Litigation"). Mr. Jenson and MSF Properties have counterclaimed 
against Ebeling in the Ebeling Litigation and have also sued Robbins separately to collect on 
the loan (and other subsequent loans) made by MSF Properties to Robbins. 
16. In May 2008, Mr. Jenson, MSF Properties and Ebeling entered into an agreement (the 
"Ebeling Restitution Agreement") pursuant to which Mr. Jenson and MSF Properties have 
agreed to provide consideration to Ebeling which Ebeling has confirmed will (a) be 
satisfactory to him as full restitution from Mr. Jenson in connection with the Ebeling Funds 
and (b) definitively resolve all outstanding matters in the Ebeling Litigation as between 
Ebeling, on the one hand, and MSF Properties and Mr. Jenson, on the other hand. Ebeling 
has also confirmed that he fully supports the resolution of this matter as set forth in this 
Stipulation and Consent Order. 
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(Rick C. White) 
17. In the summer of 2001, Rick C. White ("White") invested $5,000,000 with Wilshire in two 
separate investments (the "White Investment"). 
18. Pursuant to a series of settlement agreements entered into between Jenson and White from 
2003 to 2005, (a) Jenson paid White $6,125,000 in cash and real estate, receipt of which 
White acknowledged in such agreements and in sworn testimony at Defendant's preliminary 
hearing in this matter, and (b) White released all of his claims against Jenson. 
II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Statute of Limitations 
19. The alleged conduct of Mr. Jenson and MSF Properties in connection with Bodell Investment 
#1 occurred outside of the statute of limitations period. 
Sale of Unregistered Securities 
20. The investments made by Bodell, Ebeling and White with MSF Properties and/or Wilshire 
constituted "securities" under Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-13(l)(x). 
21. The securities were offered without registration. 
22. The securities did not constitute "federal covered securities" within the meaning of Utah 
Code Ann. § 61-1-13(1)(1) and didnot qualify under any of the exemptions from registration 
set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-14. 
23. Accordingly, MSF Properties and Mr. Jenson violated Utah Code Ann. §61-1-7 with respect 
to Bodell Investment #2, the Ebeling Funds and the White Investment. 
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Other Matters 
24. Other matters involving Bodell Investment #2, the Ebeling Funds and the White Investment 
were referred to the Office of the Attorney General. An Information was filed by that office 
against Mr. Jenson in August 2005. In May 2008, the Attorney General's Office filed an 
Amended Information in that case, and Mr. Jenson has entered into a plea bargain 
arrangement with the Attorney General's Office in connection with such matters. 
III. AGREEMENT 
25. Respondents MSF Properties and Marc S. Jenson neither admit nor deny the Division's 
investigative Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, but nonetheless consent to the entry 
of an Order: 
a. Preventing Respondents from selling or offering for sale securities in any form in or 
from the State of Utah until such time as the securities have been registered with the 
Utah Division of Securities in accordance with Title 61, Chapter 1, UTAH CODE 
ANN., unless such securities and/or such offering are exempt from such registration 
requirement (1) under Section 61-1-14 of the Utah Uniform Securities Act, (2) under 
Blue Sky Regulation R164-14-2n of the Utah Administrative Code, (3) as a federal 
covered security for which Respondents make the proper notice filings, or (4) 
otherwise as permitted under Utah law; 
b. Requiring that, while engaged in or in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of 
any security, that Respondents be prohibited from: 
1. Employing any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
6 
2. Making any untrue statement of material fact, or omitting to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the 
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading; 
3. Engaging in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person; and 
c. Requiring MSF Properties to pay a fine of $ 15,000 to the Division. 
IV. FINAL RESOLUTION 
26. MSF Properties and Mr. Jenson acknowledge that (a) this Stipulation, upon approval by the 
Division Director, will be the final compromise and settlement of this matter, and (b) neither 
this Stipulation nor the Order shall affect any civil causes of action that third parties may 
have against Respondents arising in whole or in part from Respondents1 actions. 
27. This Stipulation and the Order (a) constitute the entire agreement between the parties herein 
relating to the subject matter hereof, (b) constitute the final action of the Division with 
respect to the specific matters addressed herein, and (c) supersede and cancel any and all 
prior negotiations, representations, understandings, or agreements between the parties 
relating to such matters. 
28. There are no verbal agreements which modify, interpret, construe, or otherwise affect this 
Stipulation or the Order in any way. 
29. Respondents acknowledge that the Order does not affect any civil or arbitration proceedings 
that third parties may have against Respondents arising in whole or in part from Respondents' 
actions, and that the Order does not affect any criminal causes of action that a prosecutor 
might bring. 
7 
30. A willful material violation of this Stipulation (if and as proven in a criminal proceeding) 
shall constitute a third degree felony pursuant to Section 61-1-21(1) of the Act. 
[Remainder of Page Intentionally Blank - Signature Page Follows] 
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Utah Division of Securities MSF Properties, L.C. 
Marc Sessions Jenson 
Date: Date: 
By: By: 
Name: Marc Sessions Jenson, personally 
Title: and as manager of MSF Properties, 
L.C. 
Approved: 
Assistant Attorney General 
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DATED this day of May, 2008. 






Pursuant to the terms of the Stipulation and Consent Order above, the Director of the Utah 
Division of Securities hereby enters the following orders: 
1. Respondents MSF Properties, L.C., and Marc S. Jenson are hereby Ordered to cease and 
desist from: 
a. selling or offering for sale non-exempt securities in any form in or from the State of 
Utah until such time as the securities have been registered with the Utah Division of 
Securities in accordance with Title 61, Chapter 1, UTAH CODE ANN., unless such 
securities and/or such offering are exempt from such registration requirement (1) 
under Section 61-1-14 of the Utah Uniform Securities Act, (2) under Blue Sky 
Regulation R164-14~2n of the Utah Administrative Code, (3) as a federal covered 
security for which Respondents make the proper notice filings, or (4) otherwise as 
permitted under Utah law; and 
b. while engaged in or in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any security, 
1. employing any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
2. making any untrue statement of material fact, or omitting to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the 
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading; 
3. engaging in any act, practice or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person; and 




David W. Tufts (8736) 
Erik A. Olson (8479) 
Jason R.Hull (11202) 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
P.O. Box 4050 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-4050 
(801)415-3000 
(801) 415-3500 fax 
Attorneys for defendant Mark H. Robbins 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
MARK H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE & 
WALKER INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company; 
CHEROKEE AND WALKER, L.L.C., a 
Utah limited liability company; BANK 
ONE, UTAH, National Association, a Utah 
corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING 
MARK ROBBINS' MOTION TO 
EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF 
MERRILL WEIGHT 
Case No. 030917018 
Judge John Paul Kennedy 
On July 27, 2007, at 9:00 a.m., the Court heard oral arguments on (1) Defendant Mark 
Robbins7 Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Menill Weight; and (2) Defendant Mark 
Robbins' Motion to Reopen Fact Discovery and Extend Expert Deadlines. Defendant JPMorgan 
FILED 0ISTKSGT GOTBT 
Third Judicial District 
AUG 2 2 2007 
Deputy Clerk 
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Chase Bank, N A , successoi by meigei to Bank One, N A ("Bank One") joined in both of these 
motions Robeit J Shelby of Buibidge Mitchell & Gioss appealed on behalf of Bodell 
Constiuction Company ("Bodell") H Douglas Owens of Holland & Halt LLP appealed on 
behalf of Bank One David W Tuits and Jason R Hull of Duiham Jones & Pinegai PC appealed 
on behalf of Defendant Maik Robbms ("Robbms") Having leviewed the papeis filed by the 
paities in suppoit and opposition to these motions, and having heaid the aiguments of counsel, 
and good cause appealing, the Couit heieby FINDS and ORDERS as follows 
1 Motion to Exclude Weight Robbms' Motion to Exclude Expeit Testimony of 
Menill Weight is GRANTED Bodell will not be allowed to piesent testimony at tnal to 
suppoit those claims foi damages that aie advanced in the expert leport of Menill Weight 
lelatmg to the Benefit of the Baigam theoiy, the Modified Benefit of the Baigam theoiy, the 
Reasonable Rate of Return theoiy, and claims foi Consequential Damages The Couit holds that 
the defendants will suffei piejudice if Bodell weie allowed to piesent these damages theones at 
tual because these claims and the bases foi them weie not disclosed duimg fact discoveiy and 
defendants aie now unable to conduct fact discoveiy to lebut those theones Bodell has offeied 
no legitimate excuse foi not disclosing these theones pnoi to the close of fact discoveiy Bodell 
will only be allowed to piesent evidence at tnal on the one theory of damages that was 
pieviously disclosed, namely, that the damages aie $4 million, less payments leceived, plus 
inteiest at the statutoiy late Bodell's ability to seek punitive damages, attorneys fees, and costs 
undei this theoiy of damages foi the alleged fiaud was not consideied by the Couit in this motion 
and is theiefoie not piecluded by this oidei 
SIC 104492 2 
The Court declines to reach the questions of the legal and factual viability of the 
various theories asserted by Mr. Weight. Those issues were briefed, but the Court finds that it is 
unnecessary to rule on those issues at this time in light of the Court's decision to exclude the 
testimony of Mr. Weight on the grounds described above. 
2. Motion to Reopen Fact Discovery and Extend Expert Deadlines. Robbins' 
Motion to Reopen Fact Discovery and Extend Expert Deadlines was asserted m the alternative 
and is moot because the Court has granted the Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Merrill 
Weight. 
3. Other Issues. Bodell is permitted to provide a revised expert report from Merrill 
Weight on the damage theory that Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company is entitled to $4 
million, less payments received, plus interest at the statutory rate. Mr. Weight's revised expert 
report shall be served on the defendants not later than Friday, August 3, 2007. Thereafter, 
defendants shall have until August 31, 2007, to depose Mr. Weight and to serve rebuttal reports 
to Mr. Weight's revised expert report. Bodell shall have until September 14, 2007, to depose this 
expert designated by the defendants. 
a s > f . 
// 
/ . IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: August XU007. 
Approved as to form: 
y/(L^— 
2^2 
Juda£ fttfirfPaul Kennedy 
Thirfd/bistrict Court 
i /**} 
-•• $n%\ ? 
Robert J. Shelby// 
Buibidge & Mitfcfiell 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Bodell Construction Co. ^ Holland & Hart 
Attorneys for Defendant Bank One, N.A. 
A. Beckstead 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this /A day of August, 2007,1 caused a copy of the within and 
foregoing ORDER GRANTING MARK ROBBINS' MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT 
TESTIMONY OF MERRILL WEIGHT to be delivered via hand delivery to the following: 
Richard D. Burbidge 
Robert Shelby 
Burbidge Mitchell & Gross 
215 South State Street, Suite 920 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
John A. Beckstead 
H. Douglas Owens 
Romaine C. Marshall 
Holland & Hart LLP 
60 E. South temple, Suite 2000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1031 
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Tab 6 
RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq., (#0492) 
JEFFERSON W. GROSS, Esq., (#8339) 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Parkside Tower 
215 South State, Suite 920 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)355-6677 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BODELL CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. ^ 
MARK H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE & ; 
WALKER INVESTMENT COMPANY, ; 
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company; ] 
CHEROKEE AND WALKER, L.L.C., a ; 
Utah limited liability company; BANK ] 
ONE, UTAH, National Association, a ] 




 PLAINTIFF BODELL 
> CONSTRUCTION COMPANY'S 
) RULE 26(a)(1) INITIAL 
) DISCLOSURES 
> Civil No. 030917018 
1
 Judge William B. Bohling 
Pursuant to Rule 26(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff Bodell 
Construction Company ("Bodell') hereby makes the following Initial Disclosures: 
1. The name, and, if known, the address and telephone number of each 
individual likely to have discoverable information supporting BodelFs claims, unless 
solely for impeachment, and the subjects of the information are as follows: 
4. Mark H. Robbins C/O Jeffrey M. Jones, Durham 
Jones, & Pinegar, 111 East Broadway, Suite 900, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111. Mr, Robbins is believed to have 
knowledge concerning his transactions with Cherokee and 
Walker, his communications with, and representations made 
to, Robbins, the loans that he obtained from MSF/Jenson and 
his failure to pay the loans. 
2. Bodell has in its possession or under its control the following categories of 
documents supporting its claims: 
a. Documents relating to the MSF loans and the 
amounts owing thereon. 
b. The August 22, 2001 letter from Ben Lightner to 
"Whom It May Concern" that is attached as Exhibit A to the 
Complaint. 
c. Documents relating to the settlement between 
Bodell, MSF and Jenson. 
3. Bodell's damages constitute the funds advanced, together with interest at the 
legal rate, less the payment received from MSF. The precise calculations have not yet 
been completed. Bodell will make available for inspection copying all discoverable 
documents or other evidentiary material on which a computation is based. 
4. There is no insurance agreement under which any person carrying on an 
insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of the judgment that may be entered 
in this case or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgme^ 
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RESPONSES TO ROBBINS' FIRST 
SET OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS 
TO PLAINTIFF 
Case No. 030917018 
Judge William B. Bohling 
Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's responses to Robbins' First Set of 
Discovery Requests to Plaintiff. 
state the amount of the loan, the entity making the loan, the entity receiving the loan, the 
purpose for making the loan, and the current status of the loan.) 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 21: This information has 
already been provided in response to CW's Interrogatory Nos. 2 and 4 and all relevant 
documents have already been produced. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 22: Describe in detail all of the damages that you 
allege you have suffered because of Robbins, giving a detailed calculation of how you 
arrive at such damages, and identifying all witnesses, documents, or other evidence that 
supports your claim for such damages. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 22: Bodell objects to this 
interrogatory upon the ground that it is overbroad and burdensome to the extent that it 
calls for the identification of "all witnesses, documents or other evidence that supports 
your claim for such damages." Subject to said objection and without waiving the same, 
Bodell responds as follows: See BodelPs responses to CW's Interrogatory No. 4. Bodell 
has been damaged in the principal sum of $4 million representing the amount that Bodell 
was fraudulently induced to loan to MSF to in turn loan those funds to Robbins. Bodell 
also contends that it is entitled to recover interest at the legal rate. Bodell also contends 
that it is entitled to recover punitive damages. The documents supporting this calculation 
of damages have already been produced. Persons having knowledge of these damages 
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Bodell objects to these discovery requests to the extent that: (1) they seek 
information that is not within Bodell's possession, custody or control; (2) they seek 
discovery that is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative of other discovery conducted 
in this matter and related matters or is obtainable from some other source that is more 
convenient, less burdensome, less expensive or is otherwise equally available to 
PLAINTIFF BODELL 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY'S 
RESPONSES TO CHEROKEE & 
WALKER'S REQUESTS FOR 
ADMISSIONS, FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES AND 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF 
DOCUMENTS 
Civil No. 030917018 
Judge William B. Bohling 
Jenson on or about March 18, 2003, and generally describe the nature of each such 
individual's involvement. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Michael Bodell was involved 
in the discussions and negotiations concerning the settlement and signed the agreement. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: State specifically the amount of money Bodell 
contends it is entitled to receive from Cherokee & Walker in this action and explain in 
detail how that amount has been calculated. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Bodell contends it is entitled to 
recover from Cherokee and Walker the principal sum of $4 million representing the 
amount that Bodell was fraudulently induced to loan to Robbins and by which amount 
Bodell contends Cherokee and Walker was unjustly enriched. Bodell contends it is also 
entitled to recover interest at the legal rate. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Identify all individuals, other than those listed in 
Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company's Rule 26(a)(1) Initial Disclosures, who you 
believe possess any knowledge or information concerning any of the allegations in the 
Complaint, and briefly describe the knowledge or information you believe each such 
individual possesses. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Bodell objects to this 
interrogatory upon the ground that is over broad and burdensome. Subject to such 
objection and without waiving the same, Bodell is unaware of any persons that may have 
knowledge or information concerning the allegations of the complaint other than is stated 
in the parties' Rule 26(a)(1) initial disclosures. 
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Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company ("Bodell") hereby responds to 
Defendant Bank One's First Set of Requests for Admissions, Interrogatories, and 
Requests for Production of Documents as follows: 
REQUEST NO. 7: Admit that if Bodell prevails on all claims, the only amounts 
Bodell is entitled to recover from Bank One are the principal amount outstanding on the 
$4 Million Bodell Loan, interest on that amount at the rate provided in Utah Code §§15-
1-1 and 15-1-4, and costs of court. 
RESPONSE: Bodell admits that at this time he is not seeking punitive damages 
against Bank One. However, discovery is in its infancy and Bank One has not been 
forthcoming with all of the information requested. Accordingly, Bodell reserves the right 
to amend the complaint and seek such punitive damages should subsequent discovery so 
justify. 
INTERROGATORIES 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: For each of the foregoing Requests for Admissions 
for which your response was anything other than an unequivocal admission: 
a. Set forth in detail all facts, identify all oral communications, 
and identify all documents which support or evidence the basis for not 
responding with an unequivocal admission. 
b. Identify all persons with material knowledge of such facts and 
summarize the knowledge of each person. 
RESPONSE: Not applicable. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Itemize each and every payment and recovery you 
have received on the $4 Million Bodell Loan and the $1 Million Bodell Loan, including 
the date received, the amount, and the person who made the payment. Identify all 
documents constituting such payments. 
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SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO 
BANK ONE'S FIRST SET OF 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS 
Civil No. 030917018 
Judge William B. Bohling 
Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company ("Bodell") hereby supplements its 
response to Defendant Bank One's First Set of Requests for Admissions as follows: 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS 
REQUEST NO. 7: Admit that if Bodell prevails on all claims, the only amounts 
Bodell is entitled to recover from Bank One are the principal amount outstanding on the 
$4 Million Bodell Loan, interest on that amount at the rate provided in Utah Code §§15-
1-1 and 15-1-4, and costs of court. 
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE: Admit. Discovery is in its infancy and 
Bank One has not been forthcoming with all of the information requested. Accordingly, 
Bodell reserves the right to amend its Complaint to seek punitive damages should 
subsequent discovery justify such relief. 
DATED this Q "day of August, 2004. 
BURBIDGE 
RICHARD D. BURBIDGE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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